Is Fichte’s argument for the existence of other minds successful?

By Teresa Macey-Dare, for University College London, 2023

Introduction

Although the most directly inspired by Kantian philosophy of all the German Idealists, Fichte nonetheless highlights its systematic incompleteness and theoretical inadequacy insofar as it fails to address “how I come to assume that there are rational beings outside of me”.[1] This is, Fichte thinks, fundamentally lacking - not only within Kant’s moral framework centred on a mutual recognition of rational beings.[2] Viewing the domain of the moral to be pervasive in all activity, Fichte pursues a science[3] of ethics premised on “a deduction of the moral nature of the human being or of the ethical principle therein”.[4] Furthermore, if we concede that (as Fichte attempts to show) the “concept of a human being is not the concept of an individual - for [this…] is unthinkable”[5], then demonstrating the existence of other minds is imperative for grounding the existence of oneself as a human being. That is, as a free, rational, self-conscious being. Paralleling Kant, the project of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is one of Transcendental Idealism - discovering the conditions of the possibility of X.[6] The system that thus emerges can be comprehended in terms of Holistic Monism: based in “a unique, absolute, and infinite first principle [Grundsatz…] which constitutes the unity of the totality of finite items, is immanent within that totality, and is in no sense transcendent of it”.[7] 

To provide necessary context for the comprehension of his argument, I synthesise extracts from the System of Ethics and Foundation of Natural Right (FNR) - setting up the nature and possibility of self-consciousness - before turning explicitly to the existence of other minds. Playing on the ambiguity of the term ‘success’, I argue that whilst Fichte’s argument successfully fulfils its role within his transcendental system, it does not successfully explain the existence of other minds as a practical possibility. 

Fichte’s argument for the existence of other minds 

The aim of the FNR is threefold: proving that we are active, that such activity is sometimes directed at free beings, and thereby, that we stand in relations of right with these beings. Fichte begins with what he thinks we most fundamentally are: willing. “Then, by means of thinking, I add to this act of willing [...] something that is supposed to be the willing subject [das Wollende]”.[8] Perceiving the willing, I think of myself as a willing subject. Self-consciousness, it thus seems, consists in thinking and willing. The former possesses a uniquely inward-directed intentionality (insofar as the thinker and the thought are one and the same) and must therefore ‘counterposit’ itself (Gegensetzen) in order to gain a derived objectivity. Willing, in being essentially other-directed, provides an ‘original objectivity’[9] through which this can occur. So, Fichte asserts, “only under the condition that I become conscious of willing do I become conscious of myself”.[10] The empirical I (thinking) and absolute I (willing) appear unified in the self-conscious subject - possessing an “absolute indeterminability through anything outside itself”.[11] To this end, the rational intellect is freely self-determining. Unlike a compressed spring bound by its nature to return to its original shape, the “necessary concept of the intellect’s acting” is determined but “the acting of the free intellect is not actually determined, is not mechanically necessary”.[12]  

This leads on to Fichte’s first theorem regarding the very possibility of self-consciousness: “a finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing a free efficacy to itself”.[13] Following from Fichte’s conception of the ‘I’ (rational nature instantiated in the individual), “willing and representing stand in constant, necessary reciprocal interaction”.[14] The I forms a practical and theoretical relation to the material world, wherein it is at once being acted upon and itself an acting. This is because, insofar as the being that is represented in self-consciousness is a finite rational one (counterposited, and hence distinguishable from the not-I), it can only reflect upon something limited. However, recall that the action of the will is free; the subject possesses a causal efficacy they are simultaneously aware of such that “The I is what it is in acting, the object in being. The I exists in a state of endless becoming”.[15] Intuiting the world (namely, through the counterpositing required for thinking) limits the free activity of the will, affording a barrier that forces reflection. In turn, the “subject [...is] determined to be self-active by means of an external check [Anstoß]”[16] and the I is practically possible. In this way, the rational being is both able to retain the primary condition for its nature as such (free efficacy) and yet be “limited and determinate and therefore capable of being grasped by reflection.”[17]   

However, an infinite regress arises: “each act of representation presupposes a prior act of self-determination to achieve an end”.[18] Because our intuiting of the world is an activity and not merely some passive intake of sense perceptions, we must posit ends according to which to organise the information we perceive. Yet, knowing which features afford salience relies on information from prior sense perception. Thus, as Fichte recognises, “we have not found any possible moment in which we might attach the thread of self-consciousness (through which alone all consciousness is possible).”[19] The metaphor of sewing does explanatory work here - illuminating the need for the introduction of a “new kind of object, synthetically combined with our act to be done in the same moment”.[20] A knot in the thread to anchor self-consciousness and make it possible. This is provided by the second theorem, in which Fichte attempts to “demonstrat[e] the existence of other I’s as a transcendental condition for the self-positing of the I”.[21] The possibility of self-consciousness rests on there being other rational finite beings outside of oneself. 

Following from my explication of the nature of the self-conscious I, Fichte contends that we must “assume that the subject’s efficacy is synthetically united with the object in one and the same moment”.[22] This leaves us to explain how the state of unification between the absolute I and empirical I comes about - since, as Guilherme puts it, “the Absolute I continuously creates - ie. causes to be, the relative “I’s” and nature as not-I”.[23] Because the self-directed intentional state of self-consciousness positions the I as both the thinker and the thought, we must find a moment in which the subject’s free efficacy caused itself to exist. Such is the state in which the object (thought) and efficacy (thinking and willing) are united and thereby self-sufficient. Herein lies the rationale for positing the existence of other minds: external, rational, free and self-conscious beings. These, Fichte believes, both causally initiate and provide a limitation on the I’s activity - literally ‘summoning’ it into being, making it “determined to be self-determining”.[24] The I, is constrained in the exercise of its freedom insofar as it must act within the sphere of reason. The relation of the I to other rational beings, is hence one of limit and liberation; “The social drive aims at interaction, reciprocal influence [...not mere] causality, at the sort of mere activity to which the other person would have to be related passively”.[25] 

Spanning meanings from bitten (to request) to verlagen (to require)[26], the original German Aufforderung captures the summons’ being a call to free action, leaving the summoned nonetheless free to “act in accordance with the summons or [not]”.[27] With the central purposiveness of the summons dependent on both the freedom and understanding of the being towards which it is directed (the self-consciousness to be actualised), Fichte stresses, the summoner must themself be an intelligence “necessarily possess[ing] the concept of reason and freedom”.[28] Furthermore, because one’s inner sense only reproduces outer sense-perceptions, the summoner must be an individual in the material world outside of oneself. Otherwise, we arrive at a variant of the infinite regress problem since self-consciousness would continually presuppose itself. The summons, as Fichte presents it, hence provides a mechanism through which one is themself united in rational being, and unifies the subjective and objective (echoing the sentiment of German Idealism). This is of theoretical and practical normative significance for our being in the world; “self limitation initiates an activity whose end is reciprocal recognition”.[29] Fichte clearly shares this sentiment in making the existence of other minds integral to his moral system. As he claims, “No Thou, no I; no I, no Thou”.[30] We mutually actualise one another’s rational (hence moral) being. 

How successful is Fichte’s argument?

a) Success within his system 

To the extent that a subject’s efficacy could not cause itself to exist because then “consciousness can be explained only circularly; thus it cannot be explained at all, and so it appears to be impossible”[31] Fichte requires the existence of other minds for the possibility of self-consciousness (the Grundsatz). The argument thus forms an integral part of his system; functioning as a transcendental condition. To successfully fulfil this role, it must support the following two claims:[32]   

    i) anti-solipsism - other beings of a certain kind exist in the external world 

    ii) causal efficacy - these beings are capable of actualising the I. 

i) may be further separated into the claims that ia) there is a material world outside of oneself, and ib) some of the entities within this material world are minds. As previously emphasised, we must assume the existence of the external world so that “the subject’s free activity is posited as constrained”[33] and self-consciousness thereby possible. At the same time, the absolute freedom of the subject entails self-active engagement with objects - perceiving the material world in certain ways according to ends freely set. This provides further certainty in the existence of the external world beyond solipsistic construction, because the objects must be given in “outer [...] sensation: for all inner sensation arises only through the reproduction of outer sensation; the former [...] presupposes the latter.”[34] The external world, it thus seems, must exist given self-consciousness. However, perhaps Fichte is begging the question. As made salient in his XVI lecture on the Wissenschaftslehre, self-consciousness involves a thought that is both presently actualised, and not able to be given a conscious account of. “Therefore” Fichte goes on, “this consciousness projects a true reality outward, discontinuously”.[35] Such is the counterpositing of the I. Here, I interpret ‘discontinuously’ to mean that the reality inferred by this activity, is a sensible world distinctly outside of the subject. 

Taking Fichte’s system in terms of Holistic Monism[36], I will show that if we can establish ib), then the apparent circularity plaguing ia) can be seen in a virtuous rather than vicious light. It seems, at first, that the I can be sufficiently individuated “without supposing actual rational beings outside myself, [rather] by thinking of alternative possibilities to my individual agency, adopted either by other possible beings or even by myself.”[37] What Fichte must demonstrate, therefore, is that the existence of other minds is not just a theoretical possibility but a necessity for my existence as a rational being. Considering the moral underpinnings of Fichte’s project is illuminating; being determined to be self-determining is fundamentally normative because it defines individuality not merely as differentiation of the I through facts, but “in possibilities of acting through which I actively determine who I am”.[38] In order to transition from setting ends, to giving reasons and actualising those ends, “my own self-consciousness begins with my consciousness of another’s consciousness as addressing me.”[39] A material world of purely non-rational objects could not afford this consequence. The possibility of self-consciousness therefore relies on the actual existence of beings such as myself - other minds capable of addressing (and so actualising) one another through reason. This bolsters Fichte’s claim that the cause of the summons must itself be a rational being (ie. possess the concepts of freedom and reason). Hence, “the first principle is the inescapable and absolute will to responsiveness, [grounding] the circle of individual representation and volition, [...] by which it is conditioned.”[40]  Interpreting this through the lens of Holistic Monism, “the first principle and every other component of the system are mutually conditioning”.[41]   

I now turn to assess the claim that independent rational beings can causally establish the existence of one’s own rational being (ii). Given that other minds possess (as one’s own) a free-efficacy of the will, it is at least plausible to assume that they are capable of summoning the I into being. “The very activity of reflection is the cause, or at least a part of the cause, of the generation of objects”[42] because the absolute I manifests inner sense perceptions via the ends it sets for outer perception. Here I take ‘objects’ to include everything within the material world - notably, rational objects (other minds). To the extent that I am self-conscious, and behave in a way that facilitates and affirms this, the free efficacy of my will presents itself. “To be an ‘individual’” Altman suggests, “I must not only have formal freedom but must be conscious of myself as a discrete source of effective agency, set apart from others”.[43] However, recall that the external world affords limitation. Counterpositing of the not-I gives the I; “as an embodied self, the I confronts a limitation to its activity that is also a condition of its very subjectivity”[44], but thereby also restrains the free-efficacy of the will. In turn, we can question how one rational being is able to actualise that of another, where this ‘other’ exists in the external material world. It would seem that the very possibility of mutual actualisation contradicts the very possibility of individual self-consciousness, which the former realises. 

Yet, this paradox may be reduced to undue assimilation of other minds with the non-rational features of the external world, attributed to my description of other minds as ‘objects’[45]. Fichte’s emphasis on intersubjectivity explicitly avoids this. Here Franks’ example of the summons provides clarity: a parent feeding a child, gradually comes to involve the idea that if the child shows no interest, the parent must start to give reasons for their participation. At some point the child may realise what the parent is up to; “in recognising this summons to act for a reason, [the child] discovers [themself] as a free and individual agent, who has a choice”[46] to act either in accordance with, or contrary to their parent’s action. Hence, perceiving this as “an attempt to solicit [the child’s] free self-determination to act - [their] will is necessarily engaged”.[47] Insofar as we see and treat the other as a self-conscious I (ie. a subject), we really do have causal efficacy to actualise their rational being. In this way, the argument for the existence of other minds can successfully ground the possibility of self-consciousness and a community of rational beings. 

    b) Success as a plausible theory 

That the argument is able to fulfil its designated function is not, however, sufficient to guarantee the plausibility of the mechanism through which it achieves this end - namely, the hypothesis of the summons. As established, the summoner must be (and self-consciously consider themself to be) a rational intelligence. This, of course, is predicated on their being summoned - such is the nature of Fichte’s intersubjective idealism. Before elucidating the issue with this, I note what it is not: the possibility of solipsistic regress to the subjectivity of a ‘first summoner’. Otherwise put, that the first summoner is or could exist as an immaterial mind outwardly projecting the existence of the material world. This is because, to exercise the formal freedom of the absolute I, the empirical I recognises itself and other minds as not merely embodied, but embodied in a certain form.[48] As Altman frames it: “the body is the will viewed from a different perspective, as a thing and the means through which I can effect change in the world, since only matter can affect matter.”[49] The problem with the summoner requiring their own summoner and so forth, thus reveals itself as one of infinite material regress. Fichte must explain the genesis of the summons within the world. As Phillips stresses, for Fichte as for Kant, “in any explanation of an event there should be a strong prima facie warrant for assuming that the event is explicable in natural terms”[50]; the explanation for the summons should not be given in supernatural terms, for example by an appeal to God. Such is the near-naturalism Fichte appears to subscribe to. 

I emphasise, however, that because Fichte rejects the concept of things-in-themselves, the idea of the world follows from the nature of the I, rather than vice-versa. This is possible given our materiality: “Fichte’s deduction of the systematic or organic structure of nature proceeds from his deduction of the human body as an articulated tool of the will.”[51] The suggestion then, is that, we must possess bodies capable of being summoned; the existence of our body in the very form that it exists, is a necessary condition for the existence of the mind through which it acts. Again, noting Fichte’s moral lens, explains and heightens this necessity. Because a theoretical principle for the determination of the world could be found in freedom, and what Phillips terms the world “articulation and organisation”[52] comes about from this freedom; necessitates our self-conscious being; and somehow reflects the nature of the I, then it could be the case that free rational beings (hence morality) are mere contingencies.[53] It must therefore be that the moral world order makes the existence of human beings inevitable, and in turn, that we are constituted in such a way so as to be summonable. 

Combining this thought with Fichte’s anthropological remarks, we can view the summons as a practical process. As Fichte writes: “The summons to engage in free self-activity is what we call upbringing [Erziehung].”[54] At the beginning of this process (where this refers both to the genesis of summoned-summoner dynamics, and discrete instances of summoning), I posit proto-persons[55], who possess the capacity for self-consciousness given their certain embodied form. Though not yet summoned, they are summonable. Fichte invokes this perspective in claiming that “I become a rational being – actually , not merely potentially – only by being made into one.”[56] In virtue of an innate but limited cognitive ability (ie. the potential for self-consciousness) proto-persons are responsive enough to their environment that they learn to communicate with it; this environment of course, including other (proto-)rational beings. Fichte’s framing of the summons in terms of Anstoß - a process of external checking and reflective adjustment - makes this salient, revealing “education or upbringing through human interaction [to be] transcendentally necessary [...] for rational agency”.[57] However, the genesis problem resurfaces: if our existence as rational beings is dependent on a unification of consciousnesses[58] through an ongoing intersubjective process, how does the human being ever become actualised? Our existence in a state of dynamic equilibrium with other minds, both involved in summoning and being summoned, does not provide the requisite end-state: an individual who is actualised, summoned, rather than bound to the process of being actualised or summoned. For the possibility of summoning, there must not only be a proto-person endowed with summonability, but an actualised rational being capable of using their self-efficacy for summoning. Practically explaining the existence of other minds thus appears as a pervasive problem. 

Conclusion 

Fichte posits the existence of other minds as a transcendental condition for the possibility of self-consciousness, on which the system of his Wissenschaftslehre is founded. In this way, the existence of other minds define our being in the (moral) world: free, rational beings who stand in relations of right with other such beings. Assuming that one subscribes to the commitments of transcendental idealism of the Fichtean type - for example, its method, aim, and assumptions - Fichte’s argument for the existence of other minds succeeds in fulfilling its function. Success, when taken in terms of establishing a coherent and plausible explanation of the fact of other minds, yields a different perspective. I have argued that the account given by the summons is incomprehensible as a practical possibility, at least insofar as its emergence within the world order is not successfully explained by Fichte. Plagued with a genesis problem that results in either an infinite regress of summoning or an incoherent hypothesis of an initial summons - not least Fichte’s satirical commentary: “a spirit took [Adam and Eve] into its care, exactly as is portrayed in an old, venerable document”[59] - the existence of other minds fails to be established as a practical possibility. 

• [1] Fichte,J.G. GA, 1962ff.[1794-98], 4:2:142 
• [2] See ‘Kingdom of Ends’ - Kant,I. GMM, pg.233-236 
• [3] NB: pertaining to the German ‘Wissenschaft’ - knowable truths, systematically ordered. 
• [4] Fichte,J.G. SE, 2012 [1798], pg.20 
• [5] Fichte,J.G. FNR, 2000 [1796-97], pg.38 
• [6] X denotes the basic concept - for Fichte our own self-consciousness. 
• [7] Franks,P. 2017, pg.97 
• [8] SE, pg.26 - my emphasis 
• [9] Ibid. 
• [10] Ibid. 
• [11] Ibid. pg.33 
• [12] Ibid. pg.57 
• [13] FNR, pg.18 
• [14] Wood,A. 2017, pg.78 
• [15] FNR, pg.27-28 
• [16] Ibid. pg.32 
• [17] Ibid. pg.21 
• [18] Franks,P. 2017, pg.106 
• [19] FNR, pg.30 - NB: because, for Fichte, awareness of objects is awareness of oneself, no moment of consciousness is distinct from self-consciousness. 
• [20] Wood,A. 2017, pg.81 
• [21] Ibid. pg.73 
• [22] FNR, pg.31 
• [23] Guilherme,A. 2010, pg.7 
• [24] FNR, pg.31 
• [25] Fichte,J.G. EPW, 1988, pg.158 
• [26] Wood,A. 2006, pg.20 
• [27] GA, 4:2:179 
• [28] FNR, pg.35 
• [29] Franks,P. 2017, pg.110  
• [30] Fichte,J.G. SK, 1983[1794-95], pg.172-173 
• [31] FNR, pg.30 
• [32] My headings 
• [33] FNR, pg.31 
• [34] FNR, pg.32 
• [35] GA, 2:8:220-221 
• [36] Cf. introduction 
• [37] Wood,A. 2006, pg.17 
• [38] Ibid. pg.18
• [39] Ibid. pg.19 
• [40] Franks,P. 2017, pg.107 
• [41] Ibid. pg.106 - my emphasis 
• [42] Lachs,J. 1972, pg.312 
• [43] Altman,M. 2018, pg.8 - my emphasis 
• [44] Ibid. pg.6 
• [45] Language inherited from FNR pg.31(fn.22) 
• [46] Franks,P. 2017, pg.107 
• [47] Ibid. 
• [48] Cf. the materiality of other I’s existing in the external world (pg.8-9). 
• [49] Altman,M. 2018, pg.9 
• [50] Phillips,R. 2020, pg.45 
• [51] Breazeale,D. 2014, pg.21 
• [52] Phillips,R. 2020, pg.55 
• [53] Ibid. 
• [54] FNR, pg.38 
• [55] ‘Person’ refers to ‘rational being’ 
• [56] FNR, pg.69 - my emphasis
• [57] Wood,A. 2017, pg.89 - my emphasis 
• [58] FNR, pg.45
• [59] FNR, pg.38 

Bibliography

Abbreviations list: 

• FNR - The Foundations of Natural Right 
• GA - Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
• EPW - Early Philosophical Writings 
• SK - Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre) 
• SE - System of Ethics 

Primary sources:

• Fichte, J.G; Neuhouser, Frederick (Ed.); Baur, Michael (Trans.) “Foundations of Natural Right”, Cambridge University Press (2000 Edition), ISBN: 9780521573016 
• Fichte, J.G; Lauth, Reinhard; Gliwitzkyy, Hans & Fuchs, Erich (Eds.) “Fichte-Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften”, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog (1964ff.), ISBN: 9783772801389 
• Fichte, J.G; Breazeale, Daniel (Ed/trans.) “Early Philosophical Writings”, Cornell University Press (1988 Edition), ISBN: 9780801481215 
• Fichte, J.G; Heath, Peter & Heath, John (Ed./trans.) “Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre)”, Cambridge University Press (1982 Edition), ISBN: 9780521270502
• Fichte, J.G; Breazeale, Daniel & Zöller, Günter. “System of Ethics”, Cambridge University Press (2005 Edition), ISBN: 9780521571401

Secondary sources:

• Altman, Matthew. “Fichte’s Practical Response to the Problem of Other Minds”, from “Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte”, EuroPhilosophie Editions (2018 Edition, Vol.16), pg.1-18, DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/ref.859 
• Altman, Matthew. “The Significance of the Other in Moral Education: Fichte on the Birth of Subjectivity” from “History of Philosophy Quarterly”, University of Illinois Press (2008 Edition, Vol.25), pg. 175-186, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27745122 
• Breazeale, Daniel. “Against nature? On the status and meaning of the natural world in J.G. Fichte’s Early Wissenschaftslehre”, Philosophia OSAKA (2014 Edition No. 9), pg.19–39, URL: https://doi.org/10.18910/26554 
• Franks, Paul. “Fichte’s Kabbalistic Realism: Summons as ẓimẓum” from “Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide”, Cambridge University Press (2017 Edition), pg.92-116, DOI: 10.1017/9781139939638.006 
• Guilherme, Alexandre. “Fichte: Kantian or Spinozian? Three Interpretations of the Absolute I”, Taylor and Francis (2010 Edition, Vol.29), pg.1-16, DOI: 10.4314/sajpem.v29i1.54450 
• Kant, Immanuel; Hill Jr, Thomas & Zweig, Arnulf (Ed/trans.) “Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals”, Oxford University Press (2002 Edition), ch.2, pg.208-245, ISBN: 0-19-875180-X 
• Lachs, John. “Fichte’s Idealism”, from “American Philosophical Quarterly”, University of Illinois Press (1972 Edition, Vol.9), pg.311-318, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009458 
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• Wood, Allen. “Deduction of the Summons and the Existence of Other Rational Beings”, from “Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right: A Critical Guide”, Cambridge University Press (2017 Edition), pg.72-91, DOI: 10.1017/9781139939638.005 
• Wood, Allen. “Fichte’s Intersubjective I” from “Inquiry: Kant to Hegel”, Routledge (2006 Edition, Vol.49), pg.2-29, DOI: 10.1080/00201740500497431 
• Wright, Walter (Ed./trans.) “The Science of Knowing - J.G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre”, State University of New York Press (2005 Edition), ISBN: 0-7914-6449-0