Against Archer: the world of moral saints and the ethical status of moral enhancement

Teresa Macey-Dare, for Humboldt University Berlin, 2024

Introduction

Moral enhancement aims at the deliberate “improvement of an individual’s character, motives, or behaviour”.[1] As our widespread practices of moral education[2] suggest, this seems to be a project we value, or perhaps even feel morally obligated to pursue.[3] We can question, however, whether such ethical appraisal extends to the use of ‘neurotechnologies’ which alter “certain brain states or neural functions [...so] as to bring about the desired moral improvement”.[4] For example, the use of neurostimulation or psychopharmaceuticals to increase pro-social attitudes like trust and empathy.[5] Assuming that such interventions could, at least in theory, be possible and pursued in a way that is safe, effective, and protective of individual freedom and autonomy, some bioethicists argue for an obligation on their use. This is motivated by the idea that we need to “bring our moral consciousness [...and] physiology up to date”[6] with the ever increasing complexity and potential harm of modern ethical decisions. I term proponents of this view ‘Obligationists’. 

In this essay, I explore the success of Archer’s counter-argument from a critique of the ideal of moral perfection (‘moral saint’) towards which some neurotechnological interventions aim, to limits on our obligations to morally enhance. Whilst interesting and ambitious, I argue that Archer’s strategy fails to assert its conclusion and thereby leaves open the possibility that we could be “obliged to enhance for moral perfection.”[7] 

From moral saints to limits on moral enhancement 

“Suppose” Archer opens, “we could take a pill that would turn us into morally better people. Would we have a duty to take [it]?”[8] This scenario may not remain hypothetical for much longer; empirical research on the effect of propranolol for the reduction of implicit racial bias[9], for example, is already cited by Obligationists. If a propranolol pill could safely and efficaciously achieve an outcome we morally appraise, it seems hard to argue for a moral reason against its use. Archer agrees, but only to the extent that such enhancements do not “interfere with people’s ability to engage in other valuable pursuits”.[10] Exchanging ‘other’ for ‘nonmoral’,[11] and understanding value intuitively (ie. pertaining to some perceived good), ‘other valuable pursuits’ seem to include activities like learning an instrument or playing sports. Insofar as what Archer classes as “extreme” forms of moral enhancement - neurotechnologies that aim at “enhancing oneself towards the point of moral perfection”[12] - might mutually exclude “valuable, morally imperfect ways of life”[13], they are, on his view, not obligated. It is important to note that ‘morally imperfect’ here does not mean immoral, but rather, not wholly dominated by moral concerns. To understand why Archer equates the living of such lives with ‘other valuable pursuits’, relies crucially on how he conceives of ‘moral perfection’. 

Inspired by the work of Williams, Slote and Wolf, Archer constructs a picture on which a world of morally perfect individuals appears undesirable. It is this property (undesirability) which serves as the constraint on our obligation to morally enhance. Here I focus only on the idea of moral perfection Archer most readily uses, and is arguably also the least controversial[14]: Wolf’s ‘moral saint’. Such a person is “as morally worthy as can be”[15] because their life is “dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of others or of society as a whole”.[16]  Whether motivated by the happiness gained from helping others (the ‘Loving Saint’) or a sense of duty (the ‘Rational Saint’)[17], the moral saint will pursue the morally best course of action in any given situation. At first, this ideal of moral perfection seems hard to criticise - particularly in the case of the Loving Saint who actively enjoys their altruistic lifestyle. Yet, as Wolf highlights, the “extreme degree”[18] of moral virtues possessed by moral saints are “apt to crowd out the nonmoral virtues [...] interests and personal characteristics that we generally think contribute to a healthy, well-rounded, richly developed character.”[19] Adopting the same language of extremity, Archer connects the conception of moral sainthood to the Obligationist ideal of moral perfection: extreme moral enhancements strive towards an extreme degree of moral virtue (ie. moral sainthood). Zohny’s thought experiment[20] illuminates why this does not constitute a “model of personal well-being toward which it would be particularly rational or good or desirable for a human being to strive”.[21] 

Imagine that an individual (‘Beneficent’) starts taking a morally enhancing drug (‘Altruix’). The positive changes, for example, becoming kinder and more generous, improve both the lives of those around Beneficent and provide her with a new sense of positivity and purpose. However, as she continues to take Altruix: “she feels constantly exhausted and in pain, crying herself to sleep at the thought of others’ suffering”.[22]  Dominated by an imperative to pursue the morally best course of action, Beneficent “create[s] moral value in the world [...but] suffer[s] a significant diminishment to her well-being”.[23]  Based on this conception, Archer’s position can be formalised as follows.[24] 

P1: Extreme neurotechnological moral enhancement, advocated for by Oligationists, strives towards an ideal of moral perfection. 

P2: ‘Moral perfection’ can be understood in terms of ‘moral sainthood’. 

Assumption 1 [A1]: We value the existence of nonmoral traits (characters) and pursuits (actions). 

P3: A state of affairs in which these scarcely exist - the world of moral saints - is undesirable. 

Assumption 2 [A2]: Obligations to bring about a certain state of affairs are conditional on the desirability of those states of affairs. 

P4: The undesirability of a world of moral saints, forms of a limitation on our obligation to morally enhance. 

C: We are not obliged to enhance for moral perfection. 

Rejecting the undesirability of a world of moral saints

Though debatable whether Obligationists are really committed to the claim that we ought to improve ourselves towards moral perfection, at least some formulations of the view suggest so.[25] Given that it is these which Archer seeks to challenge, we can accept P1.[26] Questioning how we should conceptualise ‘moral sainthood’ in P2, however, I intend to demonstrate the instability of P3. Granting both assumptions - that a world devoid of nonmoral value would be undesirable (A1), and that this could constrain our obligations to actualise it (A2) - I nonetheless argue that this world is not equivocal to the world of moral saints. 

    a) Reconceptualising ‘moral sainthood’ (P2) 

As proposed, we can understand the Obligationist ideal of moral perfection critiqued by Archer in terms of Beneficent, which aligns with Wolf’s presentation of moral saints.[27] Recall that such individuals are stunted in the development of their characters, so much so that they become “too good for [their] own wellbeing”.[28] In arguing as such, I believe Wolf reveals background commitments to a virtue-ethical framework: “an approach emphasising the centrality of the role of character traits (virtues), [...] for persons to be good and to live well.”[29] On Aristotle’s formulation, both moral and prudential value[30] are ascribed to the concept of ‘goodness’, such that the ethically good or virtuous life is inseparable from the one of individual flourishing or well-being. This is reflected in Wolf’s appeal to the “point of view of individual perfection”[31]: a stance centred on the types of people it would be good for both ourselves and others to be. My specification of Aristotelian virtue ethics finds further support in Wolf’s language and concepts - for example, showing sensitivity to the interchangeable translations of arete as virtue and excellence[32], alongside appeals to the human good and realisation of human potential.[33] 

In highlighting these commitments, however, a competing picture of moral sainthood emerges. Where Wolf proposes that the moral saint possesses moral virtues to a constraining ‘extreme degree’ (fn.18), Aristotle’s definition of virtues as intermediate states between excess and deficiency[34] in fact precludes individuals who are (to quote Wolf) “very very nice”[35] from being the most ‘morally worthy’ (fn.15). In other words, from being moral saints. Moreover, the scope of virtues essential for moral life - ethike arete - goes beyond typically moral virtues (eg. justice) to also include nonmoral virtues (eg. wittiness).[36] Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that nonmoral virtues such as “rationality, intelligence, persistence, courage, or humour” are “qualities of successful moral sainthood.”[37] Without these, the moral saint might not only be ill-equipped to pursue the morally best courses of action, but risk the kind of empathy fatigue - an “inability to distance [oneself] emotionally from the pain and suffering [one encounters]”[38] - displayed by Beneficent. This finds support in the real-life cases of moral saints such as Paul Farmer; contrasting Wolf’s picture, it is precisely through Farmer’s cynical wittiness, for example the view that “life sucks and his patients are ‘the shafted’”[39], that he is motivated towards his charitable lifestyle, and able to distance himself from the immense suffering he encounters. In this way, his well-rounded character enables him to do good and to be well. 

Anticipating the challenge that it is nonetheless Wolf’s (misconceived) ideal of moral sainthood towards which the Obligationists strive (P2), I appeal to a common view of enhancement: changes to the mind or body that tend to improve well-being.[40] Consequently, interventions that aren’t good for us[41], as human beings, cannot be classed as enhancements.[42] As Beneficent reveals, drugs such as Altruix in fact have a “disabling effect”[43] on their users; they appear, in this way, as the direct opposite of enhancers. By contrast, allowing us to improve both the well-being of others through more moral behaviour, and simultaneously our own well-being, interventions towards the new conception of moral sainthood could reasonably be cast as moral enhancements towards moral perfection. Following Roduit et al.[44] I propose the ‘Capabilities Approach’[45] as a way to pragmatically ground this claim. If capabilities are to be understood as defining a thing’s function and possibilities, as the kind of thing that it is, then the more central the human capability the more “essential to a human leading a flourishing human life”.[46] An ideal of human moral perfection towards which moral enhancement aims, then, will be given in terms of enhanced central capabilities. From those described by Nussbaum[47], thought and emotions are plausibly the most central to morality; this is reflected by Obligationist appeals to the enhancement of “rational engagement, reflection and deliberation”[48], and “trust, sympathy, and generosity”.[49] 

    b) Challenging the antecedent (P3) 

Reconceptualising moral sainthood within the virtue-ethical framework as suggested, it no longer seems to constitute an unhealthy and undesirable personal ideal, as Wolf suggests.[50] This, however, is not sufficient to undermine Archer’s claim at P3 and position on the ethical status of moral enhancement by-and-large. As Archer himself notes,[51] the fact that moral sainthood might even be an attractive ideal, does not necessarily entail that a world of moral saints would not be undesirable. To suppose so, would perhaps be a fallacy of composition: mistakenly ascribing the properties of the parts to that of the whole.[52] Here, from moral sainthood as one possible way of life to a world in which everyone lives as such. It is the desirability of the latter (or lack thereof) that Archer is concerned with because the Obligationist imperative to morally enhance towards moral perfection (P1) would hold for everyone, insofar as it is a moral obligation. For my critique of P2 to bear on Archer’s argument, I must therefore demonstrate that in virtue of reconceptualising moral sainthood, a world of moral saints would not be “lacking other important values”[53] of the kind proposed in A1. The worry herein seems to be that a world in which everyone is enhanced or enhancing their more morally focused capabilities, lacks other interesting or desirable kinds of lives. Those, for example, more informed by play and imagination[54] (ie. artists). 

However, I contend that according to both Aristotelian virtue-ethics and the Capabilities Approach it seems to inspire, a world of moral saints would be far from homogenous. Recalling the inseparability of well-being or good functioning, and the living of a virtuous life (fn.30), moral sainthood must be thought of not as an end state, but a mode of being. This nuance is important because a world in which everyone were morally perfect in the same way (ie. possessing a very similar character, dominated by moral virtues) would not, I believe, be one in which people could continually develop and exercise their virtues. Aristotle illustrates this through his claim that friends are “most necessary for life”[55]: insofar as we admire qualities of others we suppose ourselves to lack, relationships with them are essential for the cultivation of our own virtues. A boorish person, for example, will seek a witty friend.[56] Furthermore, because by altering (adding, removing or enhancing) capabilities one risks “becoming something other than human”[57], for moral saints to represent a human ideal they must have “central capabilities structured in a holistic manner”.[58] On my interpretation, this description encourages a diversity of different characters, each affirming some balance of moral and nonmoral virtues. Where moral virtues are enhanced too much, individuals may no longer be able to function properly - such is the case of Beneficent, who suffers a diminishment to her capacity of bodily health.[59]   

Conclusion

Consequently I propose that the world of moral saints is not one in which nonmoral traits and pursuits scarcely exist and are thereby devalued, but rather one of inter- and intra-individual diversity of characters. It is therefore not, for the terms Archer cites, undesirable. In fact, if, as he claims, we may have a “duty to engage in less ambitious forms of moral enhancement”[60] which allow us to retain valuable nonmoral traits and pursuits, then it seems he must extend his ethical appraisal to extreme enhancements (ie. neurotechnologies) which could also facilitate this state of affairs (ie. the reconceptualised world of moral saints). Indeed, I have argued, this is at least a more accurate representation of the Obligationist ideal of moral perfection. In this way, I not only call Archer’s strategy and conclusion into question - rejecting the antecedent of his central inference (P3) - but suggest he undermines it himself. Nonetheless, the debate about the ethical status of moral enhancement remains open. There may still be good reasons to reject the Obligationist position and affirm some limits on moral enhancement; but, in refuting what I take to be Archer’s strongest argument (appealing to Wolf), I doubt that these limits could find their justification in the undesirability of the ideal of moral perfection towards which ‘extreme’ moral enhancements strive. 

• [1] Earp,B.D, et.al. 2017, pp.166 
• [2] Eg. religious practices 
• [3] Schaefer,G.O. 2015, pp.261 
• [4] Earp,B.D, et.al. 2017, pp.166 
• [5] Hauskeller,M. 2016, pp.45, and Savulescu,J; Persson,I. 2012, pp.402 - assuming the moral relevance of such attitudes
• [6] Harris,J; Savulescu,J. 2015, pp.11 
• [7] Archer,A. 2018, pp.490 
• 8Archer,A. 2018, pp.490 
• [9] Terbeck,S. et.al. 2012 
• [10] Archer,A. 2018, pp.501 
• [11] Ibid. pp.490 
• [12] Ibid. pp.501 - my emphasis 
• [13] Ibid. pp.490
• [14] Ie. we need not accept that either a) some positive upshot from immoral behaviour (Williams), or b) the immoral behaviour itself (Slote), is admirable. 
• [15] Wolf,S. 1982, pp.419 
• [16] Ibid. pp.420 
• [17] Ibid. 
• [18] Ibid. pp.421 
• [19] Ibid. 
• [20] Zohny,H. 2018, pp.270 
• [21] Wolf,S. 1982, pp.419 - my emphasis 
• [22] Zohny,H. 2018, pp.270 
• [23] Ibid. - my emphasis 
• [24] Archer,A. 2018, Sect.1-2 
• [25] See Savulescu,J; Persson,I. 2012, pp.409 
• [26] Archer,A. 2018, pp.491 
• [27] Namely the ‘Loving Saint’ archetype 
• [28] Wolf,S. 1982, pp.421 
• [29] Axtell,G; Olson,P. 2012, pp.183 
• [30] See Zohny,H. 2018, pp.268
• [31] Wolf,S. 1982, pp.437 - emphasis original 
• [32] See eg. Wolf,S. 1982, pp.426 
• [33] Ibid. pp.434 
• [34] Warne,C. 2006, pp.48 
• [35] Wolf,S. 1982, pp.422 
• [36] Warne,C. 2006, pp.36 
• [37] Hanlim,S. 2021, pp.69 
• [38] Earp,B.D, et al. 2017, pp.170 
• [39] Carbonell,V. 2009, pp.83 
• [40] Savulescu,J. et.al. 2011 from Zohny,H. 2018, pp.267 
• [41] Ie. allow for proper-functioning and resulting well-being 
• [42] Harris,J. 2007 
• [43] Zohny,H. 2018, pp.270 
• [44] Roduit,J. et.al. 2015 
• [45] Nussbaum,M. 2011 
• [46] Roduit,J. et.al. 2015, pp.628 
• [47] Nussbaum,M. 2011, pp.25 
• [48] Earp,B.D, et.al. 2017, pp.179 
• [49] Savulescu,J; Persson,I. 2012, pp.402 
• [50] Wolf,S. 1982, pp.432 
• [51] Archer,A. 2018, pp.497 
• [52] See Hansen,H. 2024, sect.1 
• [53] Archer,A. 2018, pp.497 
• [54] Nussbaum,M. 2011, pp.25 - NB: two ‘central capabilities’
• [55] Aristotle, NE1155a - where ‘life’ comes from Eudaimonia: living virtuously and flourishing 
• [56] See ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ - NE1108a 
• [57] Roduit,J. et.al. 2015, pp.628 
• [58] Ibid. 
• [59] Cf. Nussbaum’s ‘central capabilities’ - Nussbaum,M. 2011, pp.25 
• [60] Archer,A. 2018, pp.501 

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