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The significance of Nietzsche's Ascetic-Ideal

By Teresa Macey-Dare, for University College London, 2022


Introduction


Nietzsche’s ‘Genealogy of Morals’ (GM) seeks to problematise broadly accepted assumptions and institutions of morality, with a particular focus on traditional religious belief. Central to this project is his assessment of the ascetic-ideal. This essay will provide an in-depth exploration into the nature and significance of this feature - both for Nietzsche’s revisionary history of Christian morality, and the broader implications he believes it has upon society. 

My exposition begins by addressing the nature of the ascetic-ideal, by distinguishing occasional ascetic practice from the living of an ascetic life. The latter, it will be shown, is a synthesis of anti-naturality and life-denial. In section two, I explore the significance of the ascetic-ideal, firstly in GM as the culmination of (corrupt) Christian morality, and then in terms of the nihilism that Nietzsche believes it results in.

Moving on to the more critical portion of the essay, section three examines the extent to which Nietzsche is convincing. Here I address two distinct questions: i) is his narrative about the ascetic-ideal plausible? and ii) are his grounds for rejecting the ascetic-ideal sound? The former draws on Srinivasan’s interpretation: Nietzsche’s account must provide a coherent alternative to the Christian narrative for it to induce ‘genealogical anxiety’.[1] Arguing that his story is sufficiently coherent, I will then target what it is for something to affirm life and assess if ascetic-ideal does in fact fail to do so - since this forms the backbone of Nietzsche’s rejecting it. I ultimately defend his grounds for rejecting the ascetic-ideal and conclude that he is convincing. 


1. What is the nature of the ascetic-ideal?

    1a) Asceticism 

Following Owen, I believe that an adequate account of the ascetic-ideal first requires differentiating between ascetic practices and asceticism.[2] The former refers to instances of “self-discipline and self-constraint directed to mastering the expression of instincts and desires”.[3]  Whilst such practices involve abstaining from desire and thus denying oneself of a comfortable existence, Nietzsche does not deny their potential usefulness when adopted temporarily for the purpose of furthering some greater end - for example, a literary masterpiece. This follows my emphasis on expression. In this way, ascetic practices may be of instrumental use for furthering human potential, and thereby affirming life.[4] This is offered particular support in GS, where Nietzsche claims that “some kinds of hatred [...] stubbornness, [...] and violence [...] belong among the favourable conditions without which any great growth even of virtue is possible.”[5] I take this to include hatred directed towards oneself in the form of denial; stubbornness against the pull of desire; and violence through inflicting psychological distress or physical harm on oneself via deprivation. That ascetic practices have utility value is reinforced by the metaphor of a tree flourishing only with its roots entrenched in mud.[6]  

By contrast, asceticism refers to the living of a deliberately uncomfortable life, centred around the denial of desire and manifest in the extreme as a kind of ritualised self-harm. Since, for Nietzsche, the “instincts [of] animal man”[7] - including power-seeking, self-interest, fulfilment of sensual desires, and conflict - are natural, ascetic practices are necessarily anti-natural.[8]  However, noting their potential value when employed sparingly, being anti-natural does not appear sufficient to explain Nietzsche’s objection to asceticism. Rather, the problem seems to lie in that, when ascetic practices take the shape of asceticism, they become wholly life-denying.[9] As Owen puts it: “asceticism [treats] existence itself, as an ascetic procedure” the object of which “is necessarily not immanent to existence [...] but transcends it”.[10] There are two key points here: that asceticism is a mode of existence, and that it is adopted for some end external to this life. Because human drives have, for Nietzsche, a deep “relation to power, life enhancement, and value creation”[11], denying them is antagonistic to life. A life-denying attitude is also displayed in the ascetic’s treatment of this life as only a means to some further metaphysical end, for example heaven. Thus, asceticism (ie. a way of life) is paradoxical in nature. 


    1b) Idealised Asceticism

Nietzsche believes that because European moral systems (ultimately traceable to Christianity) are centred on an attitude of denial[12], they are all fundamentally ascetic. In turn, asceticism presents itself as “objectively valid [...-] as the only possible way of conceptualising human existence”.[13] Hence, in promoting it, modern[14] moral systems are manifestations of an ascetic-ideal. Though, on Nietzsche’s account, ascetic undertones are present from the ‘origins’ of Christianity (namely, the generation of ‘slave-morality’ as given in GM1), it is via a second revaluation of values in GM3 that they culminate in an explicitly idealised form. He suggests that priests - motivated by deep-rooted resentment of the masters - first redefined the dichotomy of good and bad, as one of good and evil. Attaching moral responsibility to action through the idea of agency, the actions of masters were now construed as sinful choices worthy of punishment, meanwhile low-status was transformed into virtue. Yet, forcing the internalisation of drives (especially to power), slave-morality “turn[ed] man back against man himself”[15], hence plaguing him with a bad conscience. Searching for a meaning for suffering, he was now susceptible to the second revaluation. 

In the “most perilous and fatal masterpiece of religious interpretation”[16], the priests employed the doctrine of Original Sin to expand the scope of evil such that it encompassed everyone’s actions and, importantly, dispositions. With willing now construed as a force of evil, but the possibility to stop not an option, the priests encouraged asceticism[17] as the best form of life. Meekness and obedience quiet the individual will. Hence Nietzsche states: “while he [the priest] soothes the pain which the wound makes, he at the same time poisons the wound.”[18]  However, it cannot be the priests’ motivation (their particular manifestation of ‘will to power’) that is the problem here. Such a reading would commit Nietzsche to the ‘genetic fallacy’: ascribing the attributes of something’s origin - corrupt motives in this case - to the thing itself. His critique of the ascetic-ideal is rather based on the nihilistic “tired[ness] of man”[19] he believes it has perfused into society. The combination of bad conscience and abstinence leads one to deny life and thus, fail to actualise the greatness of humanity. This leads on to my next section. 


2. What is the significance of the ascetic-ideal? 

 Not only does the narrative of the ascetic-ideal give force to Nietzsche’s claim that priests are the “great haters in the history of the world”[20], but within the GM it serves to embody all that is ‘wrong’ with traditional religious belief. Namely, it’s denial of life. This is not only in the ways aforementioned - for example, promoting a subservient existence based on abstinence[21], and treating this life as a means to eschatological reward - but also in its idealisation of truth. These central aspects are captured in Jesus’ proclamation: “I am the Way and the Life and the Truth”.[22] Error, for Nietzsche, is natural; there is no unrestricted drive to truth to be found in nature. In positing a superior metaphysical realm beyond this life, only reachable through this life as lived in a particular way,[23] the ascetic-ideal elevates the significance of truth and truth-seeking. This is not just problematic because it is anti-natural yet presented as an innate drive, but because the ascetic-ideal claims one “correct perception”[24] about the world and our place within it. This is, for Nietzsche, “a contradictory possibility”[25] since he regards all truths as anthropomorphic creations; expressions of perspectives. 

Noting the idealisation of truth found within the ascetic-ideal, it becomes more salient why Nietzsche holds it responsible for the nihilism of society. Not only is it present in the modern religious and moral systems[26] but also in their putative opposite: science. As Hatab articulates, though science “opposes the ‘overt’ manifestations of religion [...] its doctrines, theologies and lifestyles” the two stand on the same foundation - a will to truth.[27] Faith in science follows from the presupposition that its hypotheses and methods can (or have the potential to) reveal truths about reality. Consequently, it posits a dualistic metaphysics: the world as it appears, and the world as it ‘really’ is. This leads Nietzsche to claim that “affirm[ing] another world than that of life, nature, and history [...free-thinkers] by the same token deny [...] our world”.[28] Privileging thought over the senses and striving towards truth, the ‘free-thinkers’ (namely scientists) therefore equally engage in the life-denying tendencies of the rest of society. With the ascetic-ideal becoming ever more socially embedded, Nietzsche asserts: “Since Copernicus, man seems to have fallen on a steep plane [...] into the ‘thrilling sensation of his own nothingness’”.[29] 

In turn, the significance of the ascetic-ideal appears two-fold. For one, it is the diagnosis for the nihilistic miasma Nietzsche believes plagues modern society. Following this, it serves to motivate his emphasis on the affirmation of life - central to both an understanding of his critique of the ascetic-ideal, and the positive aspects of his philosophy. 


3. Is Nietzsche convincing?

    3a) Is Nietzsche's narrative about the ascetic-ideal plausible? 

One may assume that to have any descriptive or normative force, Nietzsche’s account must be coherent at the minimum.[30] Following Srinivasan, his story should be plausible enough to induce “genealogical anxiety: anxiety that the causal origins of our representations, once revealed, will somehow undermine, destabilise, or cast doubt on the legitimacy or standing of those representations”.[31] If it cannot call our religious and moral systems and the values they are founded on into question, the GM cannot fulfil its project. 

For the priests and masses (slaves), the story appears relatively straightforward. As Owen puts it, the priest generates the ascetic-ideal as a way of “giv[ing] expression to his desire for revenge and, in so doing, secur[ing] his own maximal feeling of power”.[32] Capitalising on what Nietzsche holds to be a fact of our condition - “indignation against suffering is not suffering intrinsically, but the senselessness of suffering”[33] - the priests gain control over the masses by providing them with the meaning they seek. The story of Original Sin simultaneously gives reason to their suffering, whilst that of Jesus provides a hope of salvation to further relieve them. Although one may note here that the priests also (and often to a greater extent) live in accordance with the ascetic-ideal, having generated it, their “power [lies in being] creative champion and leader of the weak”.[34] Furthermore, their position is still one of superiority within the church. Positioning themselves as mediators between heaven and earth, priests have control over access to God - for example, absolving sins via confession. 

But why do the priests desire power to such an extent? Recall that, for Nietzsche, a ‘will to power’[35] is one of our natural drives. As will be explored in 3b), through its deep connection to life itself, the WtoP is presented as the most fundamental drive. Hence, Nietzsche claims we find a “kind of enjoyment in overpowering [since] a living thing wants to discharge its strength”.[36] However, though this goes some way to explaining the priests’ drive for domination, it is not sufficient. If we are all indeed united by a WtoP (in virtue of its being a human instinct), Nietzsche must address i) how the masses still manifest this drive in their subservient position[37]  and ii) why the priests have a more forceful WtoP in the first place (at least in the sense of dominance over others[38]). Regarding i), one may view the slave-morality grounded on the ascetic-ideal as ultimately expressive of a deferred wish for power. That salvation is only for those who are pious, blessed, and so on[39] gives the masses power in the knowledge of their moral ‘righteousness’. Moreover, they believe that God will grant power to them after death - rewarding them in heaven, meanwhile damming non-repentant sinners to eternity in hell. The masses will take particular pleasure and, in turn, a sense of power in this, since Nietzsche holds that punishment is ultimately motivated by the “great joy [of] cruelty”.[40]  

Turning to ii), Nietzsche holds that groups of individuals in society are divided according to psychological types. Some are innately stronger than others; as I interpret him, it is these who can assert their WtoP more forcibly. This follows from Nietzsche’s comments on the connection between “noble” and “with a soul of high calibre”, and that “the powerful” are not just “high stationed” but also “high minded”.[41] One may therefore explain the priests’ particular desire for power, and success in achieving this, by contending that - just the masters in the pre-JudeoChristian society - they are of the ‘strong’ psychological type. Such a reading gains support in GM3: “he must also be strong, [...] in his will for power, so as to acquire the trust and awe of the weak”.[42] However, a contradiction seems to arise. Nietzsche stresses that the priest “must himself be sick [...] so as to arrive at an understanding with” the masses[43] and more problematically still, that the priests’ “are the weakest”.[44] One may resolve the worry by viewing the priests as being both masters and slaves, in different respects of their psychology. 

Where, then, do the masters fit into Nietzsche’s account of the ascetic-ideal? Since the priests appear to occupy the prior role of the masters (in terms of the social power-structure), perhaps the masters become priests. This coheres with their being cases of the psychologically strong type: “the warrior noble is strong, courageous, and aggressive”.[45] Yet, the latter adjectives are certainly not traits Nietzsche would ascribe to the priests. Unlike the masters, they possess an “introspective morbidity and neurasthenia”[46] - asserting their WtoP behind the veil of the ascetic-ideal, rather than directly through violence and conflict. This leads us to consider if the masters may in fact be part of the masses, over which the priests gain power. Residing in a society that had moralised their actions to the harshest extent[47], one may posit that the masters too were psychologically primed for the ascetic-ideal. However, this raises doubts about whether they were indeed manifestations of the stronger psychological type; a necessary condition of the slaves’ resentment and so ultimately the generation of the ascetic-ideal itself. Therefore I believe it most likely that the masters remained as their own category in the social framework. Seeking to retain some sense of power and distinction, this interpretation views them as the early group of ‘free-thinkers’.[48] As previously noted, these “heroic spirits [:] atheists, antichrists, immoralists [...] still believe in truth”[49] and thus assert the ascetic-ideal. 


    3b) Is his rejection of the ascetic-ideal convincing? 

Having outlined a reading on which his narrative could plausibly raise genealogical anxiety, I will now turn to assess the reasoning behind Nietzsche’s critique of the ascetic-ideal. Whilst this rests on the idea that the ascetic-ideal is anti-natural and life-denying, I will focus on the second aspect, since it is not clear the first is bad in and of itself.[50] 

I thus begin by addressing what it actually is to affirm life. Though notably ambiguous, I think Nietzsche alludes to a kind of ‘natural affirmation’: embracing life for what it is, naturally or essentially. Describing the world as “ephemeral, seductive [...] a mad chaos of confusion and desire”[51], affirming life involves acknowledging its nature as uncertain. This resonates both with Nietzsche’s discussion of i) eternal recurrence and ‘amor fati’, and ii) the intimate relation between life and the WtoP. Expanding on i), we should strive to be “the most high-spirited, vital, world-affirming individual, [...wanting] what is and was, just as it was and is through all eternity”.[52] Possessing a love of their own fate, such people embrace that life is somehow beyond our control - namely, that in virtue of being biologically embodied we have certain drives and desires - but further acknowledge that they only have this life, so harness its potential. Addressing ii), since Nietzsche believes the idea of agency originated with slave-morality, the pre-JudeoChristian masters acknowledged their power as the result of good fortune. Hence, they possessed a kind of amor fati. Elaborating on this, he maintains that by asserting our power, we affirm life. Following from his claim that “the world viewed from inside [...] would be will to power and nothing else”[53], life may even be construed as the WtoP itself.[54] Affirming life thus entails not merely acknowledging, but seeking to further the WtoP. In doing so we can become “beings who are new, unique, incomparable”.[55] 

Following most readily from the above, the ascetic-ideal may be seen to deny life in the sense that it promotes the opposite of WtoP. This is particularly salient in its original religious manifestation - reifying qualities such as charity, obedience, and poverty. However, the priests in Nietzsche’s story are clearly motivated by their WtoP. If “the desire for power is the true creative force”[56], the priests surely affirm life in generating the ascetic-ideal. Recognising the potential of their WtoP, they assert it as a way of furthering themselves.[57] As Foot suggests, Nietzsche “saw [Christianity] as a religion of pity and weakness, but also [...] the beneficially tyrannical source of spiritualization in man.”[58] The ascetic-ideal may be seen to embody this beneficial tyranny. Yet this is not only on the level of the priests. It extends to that of the masses too, if we view ascetic practices as a form of power-seeking over oneself. In this way, the adoption of the ideal may too be seen as an expression of WtoP; as Nietzsche himself claims, “Life itself must certainly have an interest in the continuance of such a self-contradiction”.[59]   

Expanding upon this reading, Soll proposes we view the ascetic-ideal in terms of the ‘vital paradox’: “a form of life strives against (the natural aims of life) - and moreover survives, prospers and prevails”.[60] Resonating particularly with the idea that conflict is necessary for greatness[61], the existence advocated by the ascetic-ideal appears to affirm life. At least, if we view it in terms of WtoP as I have put forward, wherein “life itself is essentially a process of appropriating, injuring, overpowering”[62] and “will to power can manifest itself only against resistances”.[63] In addition, Nietzsche himself construes the ascetic-ideal as a convoluted strategy towards the furthering of life: “the ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life”.[64] However, the end of the sentence - ‘of a degenerating life’ - is of great significance. Although, by inflicting suffering on myself, I gain a sense of power in overcoming my own will, it is this very will that is superseded and so rendered powerless. It thus seems apparent why Nietzsche considers “life against life” as “simple absurdity”.[65] In distinguishing between ‘life-enhancement’ and ‘life-affirmation’[66] one may account for the appearance of the ascetic-ideal as a life-affirming expression of the WtoP. Adopting a pseudo-Freudian position, Hatab contends that the ideal “struggles against a death wish”[67] - where this is understood in terms of the suicidal despair caused by meaningless suffering. It is in this sense that it enhances or preserves life, whilst still presenting an attitude of life-denial. It does not say ‘yes’ to life in the way necessary for affirmation.[68]   

One may understand this in terms of self-deception and denial. On the basis of these the ascetic-ideal cannot further human potential;[69] recall that, for Nietzsche, this appears to be the ultimate motive for life-affirmation. By ‘self-deceit’ here I am referring primarily to anaesthetising function of the ideal: in giving a meaning to suffering it “absolutely diverts the attention of the sufferer from suffering”.[70] However, one may contest that, both motivated by and resulting in resentment (firstly for the masters and then for oneself), the ascetic-ideal in fact illuminates the conflict and suffering inherent to life.[71] This is heightened in its promotion of “voluntary punishment, [...] flagellation and sacrifice of the self”.[72] Yet, Nietzsche could respond that the suffering induced by the ascetic-ideal is ‘inauthentic’: it serves only to mask the actual suffering of life (namely meaninglessness). Moreover, whilst suffering may be a key aspect of life, it is not an objective ‘Truth’ to be revealed; conceiving of it as such is just a consequence of the ascetic-ideal itself, wherein truth is problematically idealised. These comments again elucidate Nietzsche’s emphasis on life-affirmation. It is a direct reaction to, and a challenge for, the “values of decline” currently keeping “alive an abundance of failures of every type”.[73]  Pervading society, the ascetic-ideal is the root of our limitations. In this way, Nietzsche guards his critique from a final challenge: that even if the ascetic-ideal does deny life, this need not entail a rejection of it.

Conclusion 

This essay has offered an interpretation of the GM that renders it coherent enough to raise serious concerns about the ascetic-ideal. Not only is the life it advocates for, but it’s very foundation on the slave revolt in morals, based on weakness and denial. This is even more problematic if we hold Nietzsche’s story: the priests’ generation of the ideal as an ultimate expression of power. However, since suffering and the WtoP are key elements of life, this is not sufficient to entail that we reject the ascetic-ideal. Instead, Nietzsche draws upon its being wholly life-denying and hence, the driving force behind the nihilism he believes pollutes society. Thus, to undermine his critique, one need only show the ascetic-ideal to be life-affirming (or neutral) in some respect; this motivates my focus on affirmation throughout, but especially in 3b). By defending the way in which Nietzsche presents the ideal (its nature), I have argued in support of its significance. It is both the driving force behind modern day nihilism, and, in turn, the means by which we can strive towards a radically different value system. 

  • [1] Srinivasan,A. 2019 - NB: Geuss and others argue that the genealogy is a history, so must be assessed according to coherence and fact. I am suggesting that it must at least be coherent. 
  • [2] Modified from ascetic practices vs. ascetic-ideal, since I examine the ‘ideal’ feature in 1b) 
  • [3] Owen,D. 2007, pg.113 - my emphasis
  • [4] Alluding to later discussion. 
  • [5] Nietzsche,F. 2018[1882], GS.19 - see also BGE.23 
  • [6] Nietzsche,F. 2018[1882], GS.171 
  • [7] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM2.7 
  • [8] At least partly (even if seemingly driven by self-interest, or involving power-seeking over oneself) 
  • [9] Anti-natural and life-denying seem to have different connotations, though there is some overlap/ ambiguity - namely, being anti-natural is a form of denying life. See eg. GM3.11 
  • [10] Owen,D. 2007, pg.114 
  • [11] Swenson,J. 2014, pg.199 
  • [12] Ie. offering moral imperatives based on what one should not do. 
  • [13] Owen,D. 2007, pg.123 
  • [14] Taking ‘modern’ as Nietzsche’s day 
  • [15] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM2.16 
  • [16] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.20 
  • [17] See eg. Matthew 5:3-11 
  • [18] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.15 
  • [19] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM1.12 
  • [20] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM1.7 
  • [21] See eg. the Ten Commandments (‘thou shalt not…’) 
  • [22] John 14:6 
  • [23] This thereby presented as correct, right or true. 
  • [24] Nietzsche,F. 1979[1873], OTL.1 
  • [25] Ibid. 
  • [26] Think especially of Kantian frameworks based on objective moral ‘truths’. 
  • [27] Hatab,L.J. 2008, pg.114 
  • [28] Nietzsche,F. 2018[1882], GS.344 
  • [29] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.25 
  • [30] Regardless of whether it is/ should be ‘historically tethered’ (see fn1). 
  • [31] Srinivasan,A. 2019, pg.128 
  • [32] Owen,D. 2007, pg.116 
  • [33] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM2.7 - my emphasis 
  • [34] Hatab,L.J. 2008, pg.109 
  • [35] ‘WtoP’ hereafter 
  • [36] Nietzsche,F. 1973[1886], BGE.13 
  • [37] I assume that without their WtoP satisfied, slaves would seek revolt or to become priests themselves. 
  • [38] Although for the priests the object of WtoP is the oppression of others, Nietzsche primarily conceives of it as power over oneself - realising our potential by streamlining drives/ desires into an order or project. 
  • [39] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM1.7 
  • [40] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM2.6 
  • [41] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM1.2-4
  • [42] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.15 
  • [43] Ibid. 
  • [44] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM1.2 
  • [45] Morrisson,I. 2014, pg.238 
  • [46] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM1.6 
  • [47] See GM1.7 
  • [48] Or at least a precursor. 
  • [49] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.24  
  • [50] See 1a) 
  • [51] Nietzsche,F. 1973[1886], BGE.2 - also TS.4, ch.75 
  • [52] Nietzsche,F. 1973[1886], BGE.56 
  • [53] Nietzsche,F. 1973[1886], BGE.36 
  • [54] There is ambiguity, however. Some passages suggest WtoP somehow is/‘underpins’ life - eg. BGE.186, whilst others present it more as a natural human drive - eg. AC.17. 
  • [55] Nietzsche,F. 2018[1882], GS.335 
  • [56] Morrisson,I. 2014, pg.233 - my emphasis 
  • [57] See GM3.18 
  • [58] Foot,P. 1994, pg.4 - my emphasis 
  • [59] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.11 
  • [60] Soll,I. 1994, pg.183 
  • [61] Outlined in GM2 (especially 7; 12) 
  • [62] Nietzsche,F. 1973[1886], BGE.259 
  • [63] Nietzsche,F. 1967[1901], WP.656 
  • [64] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.13 
  • [65] Ibid. 
  • [66] As it seems Nietzsche does - see BGE.257; EH Z:1 
  • [67] Hatab,L.J. 2008, pg.109 
  • [68] See eg. GS.276 
  • [69] Ie. whilst denial of the actual state of affairs may be useful - eg. to preserve life (GM3.13), such deception cannot progress life. 
  • [70] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.17-18. 
  • [71] See eg. BGE.23 
  • [72] Nietzsche,F. 2003[1887], GM3.11 
  • [73] Nietzsche,F. 1968[1895], AC.7 

Bibliography

Abbreviations list: 

  • AC - The Antichrist 
  • BGE - Beyond Good and Evil
  • EH - Ecce Homo
  • GM - Genealogy of Morals
  • GS - The Gay Science
  • OTL - On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense
  • TS - Thus Spoke Zarathustra
  • WP - The Will to Power 

  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Kaufmann, Walter (trans) “The Antichrist”, from “The Portable Nietzsche”, Harmondsworth: Penguin (1968 Edition), ISBN: 0140150625, Available online: https://antilogicalism.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/the-portable-nietzsche-walter-kaufmann.pdf
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Kaufmann, Walter (trans) “Beyond Good and Evil”, New York: Vintage (1966 Edition), ISBN: 0-679-72465-6
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Kaufmann, Walter (trans) “Ecce Homo”, New York: Vintage (1967 Edition), ISBN: 978-0-679-72462-9 
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Horace, Samuel. B. (trans) “The Genealogy of Morals”, Dover Publications Inc (2003 Edition), ISBN: 0-486-42691-2
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Hill, Kevin (trans) “The Gay Science”, Penguin Classics (2018 Edition), ISBN: 978-0-141-19539-1
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Breazeale, Daniel (trans) “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” from “Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth”, Atlantic Highlands N.J. Humanities Press (1979 Edition), ISBN: 1573925322
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Kaufmann, Walter (trans) “Thus Spoke Zarathustra”, from “The Portable Nietzsche”, Harmondsworth: Penguin (1968 Edition), ISBN: 0140150625, Available online: https://antilogicalism.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/the-portable-nietzsche-walter-kaufmann.pdf
  • Nietzsche, Friedrich; Kaufmann, Walter. and Hollingdale, R.J. (trans) “The Will to Power”, New York: Vintage (1967 Edition), ISBN: 0394704371 

Secondary sources: 
  • Foot, Philippa. “Nietzsche’s Immoralism” from “Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality - Essays on Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morals”, University of California Press (1994 Edition), Ch. 1, ISBN: 0-520-08318-0 
  • Hatab, Lawrence J. “How Does the Ascetic Ideal Function in Nietzsche's Genealogy?” from “Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, Penn State University Press (2008 Edition, No. 35/36), pg. 106-123, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20717928 
  • Morrisson, Iain. “Ascetic Slaves: Rereading Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals” from “Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, Penn State University Press (2014 Edition, Vol. 45, No. 3), pg. 230-257, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jnietstud.45.3.0230 
  • Owen, David. “The Third Essay: ‘What Is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?’” from “Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality”. Taylor and Francis (2007 Edition) pg. 113–130, URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653966.010 
  • Soll, Ivan. “Nietzsche on Cruelty, Asceticism, and the Failure of Hedonism” from “Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality - Essays on Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morals”, University of California Press (1994 Edition), Ch. 10, ISBN: 0-520-08318-0 
  • Srinivassan, Amia. “Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (2019 Edition, Vol. CXIX, Part 2), DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoz009 
  • Swenson, Joseph. “Sublimation and Affirmation in Nietzsche's Psychology” from “Journal of Nietzsche Studies”, Penn State University Press (2014 Edition, Vol. 45, No. 2), pg. 196-209 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jnietstud.45.2.0196

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