Aristotelian virtue ethics pt.2: the necessity of moral habituation for explaining how we become virtuous

By Teresa Macey-Dare, for University College London, 2023

Introduction

Aristotle holds that there is an intimate connection between what is good and what performs its function well. Thus, as it is “characteristic of an excellent man to do [actions that involve reason] well and nobly”[1], the human good can be thought of as “activity of the soul in accord with virtue”,[2] where ‘virtue’ (arete) pertains to the manifestation of certain excellence(s). Integral to understanding this, is Aristotle’s bipartite conception of the soul: consisting in the rational and non-rational. Since it is our ability to reason (logos) which distinguishes us from non-human animals, we fulfil our function and thereby achieve flourishing (eudaimonia) when the rational part of the soul guides our actions. However, Aristotle qualifies that one acts “in accord with reason [or minimally] not without reason”,[3] thereby not excluding the non-rational part from discussions of the human good. On the contrary, since eudaimonia is related to the activity of the soul at large, one must develop character virtues - for example temperance and generosity,[4] to become virtuous. Unlike intellectual virtues which come about through a common-sense picture of learning (hereafter “instruction”[5]) the development of character virtues occurs by a process of ‘moral habituation’[6]. In turn, understanding what exactly this is is integral to Aristotle’s explanation of how we become virtuous - where I take this in a holistic rather than strictly moral sense.[7] 

I hence begin by exploring what habituation is, before considering the explanatory role it plays within Aristotelian virtue theory. I then turn to assess its coherence through my version of the ‘Continuity Problem’. Drawing on the interconnection between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul, I ultimately conclude that habituation can only be both theoretically necessary and practically comprehensive when conceived of as a form of learning in itself. 

1. What is moral habituation?

Since virtue for Aristotle “is twofold, of thought and character”[8] his claim that how one comes to be virtuous involves two separate processes, seems plausible. To comprehend what moral habituation of character virtue entails, I endeavour to address: i) what exactly habituation is; ii) why it must be the case that character virtues result from it; and iii) how this process occurs. 

Regarding i), I suggest that the distinction between instruction and habituation maps onto the epistemological distinction between ‘know-that’ and know-how’. The former pertains to the acquisition of propositional knowledge, for example, gaining knowledge (episteme) of concepts such as the beautiful (kalon)[9] through lectures. ‘Know-how’ on the other hand relates to one’s ability to perform a task. For example, whilst it may be possible to gain theoretical knowledge of courage within the confines of a lecture hall, one cannot come to understand how it ought to be manifested and applied in action without exposure to situations in which it is called for. Aristotle presents this in terms of an analogy with crafts: in the same way that builders “become builders by building houses”, the just person “become(s) just by doing just actions”.[10] Crucial to understanding this connection between action and virtue, is Aristotle’s assumption that our nature provides the potential to recognise and acquire (character) virtues through habit. Whilst the virtues themselves are not intrinsic to us - for, if they were, the “[craftsmen] would all have been born good or bad at their craft”,[11] our ability to acquire them is. Regarding ii), given the fundamentally practical nature of character virtues, it seems intuitive that they are manifested by habituation (as opposed to, say, instruction). However, I reject explanatory accounts that focus on the external performance of virtuous actions - taking habituation as a kind of mindless habit-formation via imitation.[12] Not least, such views result in a priority problem:[13] if it is possible for learners to perform virtuous actions (ie. via imitation), then either they must already be virtuous, or it is possible to be virtuous without possessing the relevant motivations and dispositions. Yet, as Jimenez notes, Aristotle contrasts “(a) simply doing virtuous actions i.e. [those] ‘in accordance with the virtues’, and (b) doing virtuous actions virtuously”.[14] To achieve (b) one must satisfy the following conditions: 

    (1) act knowingly 

    (2.1) deliberately choose the action and (2.2) do so for its own sake or that of the ‘fine’[15]  

    (3) act from a stable and unchanging state. 

I assume that deliberately choosing an action implies doing it intentionally. Doing it for its own sake or that of the ‘fine’ is more elusive, however. This is one of three objects of choice Aristotle distinguishes: the fine, the advantageous and the pleasant,[16] though I note that the fine - kalon - is both advantageous and pleasant in itself. An integral feature of habituation is, then, that one attaches pleasure and pain to the correct objects; otherwise, one may become ignorant of the difference between apparent and actual good (fine) and pursue “pleasant things that are actually harmful” for example laziness.[17] What is fine thus allows one to perform their function well (and thereby achieve eudaimonia), by cultivating the excellences of character. Finally, explaining (3), habituation must entail the development of certain dispositions that underpin one’s motivations and consequent actions. As I interpret it, this ‘stable and unchanging state’ means both choosing virtuous actions in all situations that may require it - for example, having courage in battle and in public speaking[18] - and also not being rash in one’s decision making. 

I finally consider how practising virtuous actions facilitates the development of a virtuous character (iii). Whilst I reject accounts that detach the agent and the action, and in turn reduce habituation to the imitation of action, this is not to suggest that imitation plays no role. On the contrary, I argue in line with Hampson, that the “learner [is] engaged in a specifically emulative and reflective kind of imitation of the virtuous agent”.[19] Such ‘emulative imitation’ requires that the learner not only copies the actions of the virtuous agent, but seeks to replicate and internalise the psychology of that agent - using imagination to adopt their perspective. On the battlefield it would not be sufficient to simply observe or copy the action that the virtuous agent does, because courage is premised on the capacity to “endur[e] frightening things.”[20] Hence, the virtuous person possesses the appropriate emotional response to the situation (fright) but also recognises their duty, and thereby finds it pleasant or noble to act in a way contrary to their emotion. Emulative imitation can account for the understanding - as given by the development of relevant dispositions and motivations - that facilitates the cultivation of virtue in the moral learner through practice. 

Following from my analysis of its nature (ie. as a practical process), the necessity of habituation in explaining how we become virtuous seems apparent. I emphasise, however, that it is not sufficient because the virtuous person - in the holistic sense (cf. introduction) - must also manifest the intellectual virtues via instruction. As Aristotle states: the “excellent person is of one mind with himself and desires the same things in his whole soul”[21]; these goods are achieved through action, and serve to gratify his rational part (what gives us our humanity) most of all. Such harmony of the soul suggests that the virtuous person has a developed rational part alongside their virtues of character. Even if we restrict ‘being virtuous’ to a moral sense, agents must possess phronesis (practical wisdom) - an intellectual virtue integral to the development and application of character virtues insofar as it “furthers [the goal]” which they “make correct”.[22] Nonetheless, I consider habituation to do more work than instruction in explaining both how we become virtuous and what such a life actually is, through its emphasis on ongoing activity: habituated adults “must continue to practice the same things and be habituated by them”.[23]

2. Is habituation coherent?

    a) The Continuity Problem 

That habituation is a necessary component of Aristotle’s virtue theory does not ensure its coherence - the most serious threat to which is, in my opinion, the question of its transformative power over a learner’s psychological states. This is captured by the Continuity Problem: “how [do] non-virtuous actions, actions done under direction or even under compulsion, produce virtues?”.[24] In other words, how can the moral learner go from doing virtuous actions, to doing them virtuously (ie. become virtuous)? I formalise my interpretation of the problem as follows: 

P1: To be virtuous, one must perform virtuous actions virtuously. 

P2: This requires acting as the virtuous person would and satisfying conditions (1), (2), and (3). 

P3: Habituation as emulative imitation suggests that the moral learner adopts the perspective of the agent and thereby can act knowingly (ie. they are aware of both the action, and the relevant and appropriate motivation) (1). 

P4: This awareness facilitates deliberate choice of virtuous action (2.1).

P5: Repeatedly acting in this way, the moral learner develops a ‘stable and unchanging state’ for virtuous action (ie. they become disposed towards it). 

P6: The process from P3-P5 is, at least initially, motivated by a desire to be virtuous. 

P7: Acting virtuously, one must recognise and be motivated by the intrinsic value[25] of the virtuous actions (2.2). 

P8: The moral learner does not act for the sake of virtue or that of the fine (P6). 

P9: Habituation cannot explain how the moral learner comes to satisfy (2.2). 

C: There is a lack of continuity between habituation and being virtuous.

P2 suggests, I think, that we should read the moral agent in a ‘thick sense’. This sees them as concerned with not merely the actions but “the way in which one acts, that is, with one’s epistemic and evaluative attitudes associated with the actions one performs.”[26] Yet this conception leaves us wondering how one comes to develop the requisite knowledge of and motivation towards the ‘fineness’ of virtuous actions, and how this squares with a motivation to become virtuous. Insofar as we strive for eudaimonia as the human good resulting from “living well and doing well”[27], we desire to become virtuous in intellect and character (P6). I note that this entails not just appearing to be virtuous, for example as a rash man “wishes to deceive others into believing that he shares the attitudes of the truly brave person”[28], but rather of actually being virtuous (acting from a virtuous character/ psychology). The desire must therefore be for the sake of itself (virtue), and so appears to counter P8. Yet, as elicited through claims such as: “every virtue, though we do choose them because of themselves as well, [...] we also choose for the sake of happiness [eudaimonia]”[29], eudaimonia is not as an end state consequential to virtue but inseparable from the living of a virtuous life. This, I contend, allows us to substitute P6 as follows: 

P6*: The process from P3-P5 is, at least initially, motivated by a desire for flourishing. 

    

    b) A-pleasure and F-pleasure 

P6* appears to suggest that the motivation behind habituation is that of the other objects of choice - the advantage or pleasure of eudaimonia - as opposed to recognition of what is fine. Since “what is noble or what is advantageous appears pleasant too”[30], I reduce the motivation of the unhabituated learner to the pleasure that comes through advantage.[31] Let’s call this ‘A-pleasure’. Hampson et. al support my reading: “the typical source of motivation for the young is not the fine, but rather of pleasure or the fear of pain”[32]. In this way, although the motivation towards virtue is in some sense for the sake of virtue, we can question whether or not such motivation is indeed virtuous in itself.[33] I hence examine the motivation in terms of what is fine. This rests on a reading of P8 that “acting for the sake of the fine is somehow equivalent to choosing one’s action for its own sake”[34], where I take the former to have conceptual priority. 

By this I mean that it is the fineness of virtuous actions that makes them “intrinsically choiceworthy”[35] (ie. actually good and therefore able to be chosen for their own sake); the virtuous person “possess[es] a sort of sight by which to discern correctly and choose what is truly good [...] pleasant or noble”.[36] I believe that this is supported by and in turn serves to support, a constitutive reading of the role of phronesis.[37] On Charles’ view, phronesis synthesises desire and intellectual judgement, allowing the virtuous agent to “grasp what is good [fine]” and through this, be “attracted to act accordingly”.[38] Here, I take ‘act accordingly’ to imply that the means phronesis prescribes to the virtuous end, is in itself virtuous. Thus, it is constitutive of the fineness of that end. This clarifies the sense in which choosing for the sake of the action itself and that of the fine (2.2) may be importantly unified, even if not wholly synonymous. Highlighting that the Greek ‘kalon’ associates the fine with ideas of what is noble, beautiful, good and importantly, pleasant, it may be that the moral learner’s desire to be virtuous is indeed for the sake of the fine. At least, that is, insofar as the fine is or is linked to the proper objects of pleasure. This appears to be Aristotle’s perspective: “the things pleasant to lovers of what is noble are naturally pleasant. And actions in accord with virtue are like this”.[39] Recall, however, that the common notion of pleasure (A-pleasure) is achieved through the satisfaction of desires to achieve some gain or merely apparent good. For example, the relief that comes from escaping the battle when satisfying a cowardly urge. Since acting to achieve this end does not manifest virtue, I take the pleasure resulting from acting for the sake of the fine to be of a different sort. Let’s call this ‘F-pleasure’. As denoted by its name, F-pleasure requires an understanding of the fine; this follows Lear’s suggestion that “pleasure in the fine [should] be in some way proper to rational activity”.[40]   

On my reading, the capacity for F-pleasure is not something that the unhabituated learner - someone who is both morally and intellectually immature - currently possesses. Yet, starting with our desire to be virtuous, which is for the sake of the actions themselves although driven by A-pleasure, we later develop an understanding of what is fine that allows us to act for the sake of the fine. This facilitates a shift from A-pleasure to F-pleasure; following Hampson, both our actions and “desires can be transformed”[41] through habituation. This interpretation is again supported by a constitutive reading of phronesis; as Charles frames it, “see[ing] the attractiveness of the goal of acting [...] finely, just is for [the virtuous person] to enjoy doing fine actions”.[42] That such ‘F-pleasure’ exists and is distinct from A-pleasure comes forth in NE III.9: insofar as the brave war hero who endures a painful death “achieves [the fine end], he achieves something pleasant”.[43]  

However, perhaps Hampson’s framing of habituation as a mode of discovery through which the learner “come[s] to recognise the fine in [virtuous] actions”[44] and in turn transforms their motivation, only pushes the Continuity Problem back further. How can the initial motivation of the moral learner be, or have the potential to become, virtuous? In response, I cite Aristotle’s idea that the “fine shines through”[45] the actions or more precisely virtues in which it is manifest. This conveys a perceptibility that, I think it is plausible to suggest, is not directly apparent but revealed to the moral learner. To draw an analogy: just as a germinating plant naturally grows upwards towards the surface of the ground and ultimately the sunlight that will allow it to thrive[46], human beings possess a similar innate potential towards their good (as given by the fine).[47] Sanderse frames this idea in terms of “wisdom-guided habituation” that initially “precedes conceptualising virtue and happiness” through the fine.[48]   

    c) Habituation as a kind of learning 

Yet, since the immature moral learner has not yet actualised their potential for virtue through knowledge and understanding of the fine, and are at this point motivated by A-pleasure, they are prone to mistake apparent good for actual good. Herein lies the importance of the teacher. Just as one can position the plant into conditions more conducive to its flourishing, so too does the virtuous teacher serve to guide the moral learner towards the fine. They are not merely the object of emulative imitation but, I think, more actively involved in the habituation process: “the child’s life must follow the instructions of his guide”.[49] Hampson captures this in taking “habituation to be [...] an interpersonal, as well as practical process”.[50] Noting the role of the teacher, it seems that the distinction between habituation and instruction might not be so pronounced. Thus reconceptualising habituation as a practical kind of learning - where I take ‘learning’ to imply some kind of rational understanding - I argue that it cannot be considered in isolation from the cultivation of intellectual virtue. Rather, a corresponding intellectual education in which one develops the rational part of the soul, allows the learner to gain (theoretical) knowledge of the fine. This, combined with emulative imitation guided by the virtuous teacher, enables the moral learner to ‘see’ the fineness in and experience the F-pleasure of virtuous action. Consequently this motivates them and creates a disposition towards virtuous behaviour; “the gift of sight, of intellect, [...] ‘make[s] a difference in action’”.[51]   

As such, the Continuity Problem appears to be based in a misinterpretation of the nature of habituation - namely as a process independent from instruction and constrained to childhood. This presents it as non-intellectual and merely instrumental to ‘higher’ intellectual virtue. Yet, with eudaimonia as an active state of flourishing within the whole soul, it seems much more appropriate to view moral habits as “‘dynamic’ conditions that enable us to respond to new challenges and need ‘constant monitoring for improvement or worsening’”.[52] Instruction on the intellectual virtues provides the theoretical backdrop to the manifestation of character virtue - allowing us to acquire, assess and continually improve it, eventually becoming our own moral guides.[53] Jointly facilitating one’s becoming virtuous, I argue that virtues of character and intellect must be co-developed. This is not only to the extent that they pertain to different parts of the soul, but furthermore, due to their mutual dependence for the very possibility of their respective processes. When describing the constitution of the soul, for example, Aristotle comments that the “nonrational [...] shares in reason in a way”[54] - a thought only reinforced by my discussion of phronesis and, in the other direction, the comment at NE1179b about the need for a soul to be primed by habituation to be able to acquire intellectual virtue. I hence refute P9, and in turn, the conclusion of the Continuity Problem. 

Conclusion 

As the process by which a person comes to acquire character virtue, moral habituation is necessary in the explanation of becoming virtuous, though not by itself sufficient - assuming we adopt an Aristotelian conception of the soul. Since the virtuous person must cultivate virtue in both the rational and non-rational part, it is common to treat the processes of instruction and habituation discreetly. However, doing so is both the root of a serious challenge to the coherence of habituation, and fails to capture the importantly unified nature of the soul. I argue that it is only through dissolving the divide and viewing habituation as a kind of learning in itself that one can only account for its transformative effect on moral psychology. Without some knowledge of the ‘fine’, how an agent becomes motivated by and disposed towards acting for the sake of the fine seems unexplainable. However, such dependence on instruction does not diminish the significance of habituation. Without this process individuals will both struggle to develop moral character, and be inhibited in acquiring the intellectual virtues; thus “whether people are habituated in one way or another [...] makes all the difference”.[55]   

• [1] NE1098a 
• [2] Ibid. 
• [3] Ibid. 
• [4] NE1103a 
• [5] Sanderse,W. 2020 - Ie. teachers lecturing students 
• [6] Hereafter, ‘habituation’ 
• [7] Ie.being virtuous means having virtue in the whole soul 
• [8] NE1103a 
• [9] Spencer,M.K. 2020, pg.93-94 
• [10] NE1103a-b 
• [11] NE1103b 
• [12] See Bowditch,N. 2008 - from Sanderse,W. 2020, pg.100 
• [13] Jimenez,M. 2016, pg.4 
• [14] Ibid. 
• [15] NB: I adopt Irwin’s trans (‘fine’) over Reeve’s (‘noble’) since I think this better captures ‘kalon’ 
• [16] NE1104b - ‘object of choice’ is something we take pleasure in 
• [17] NE1166b (Irwin) 
• [18] Assuming both could be the objects of fear 
• [19] Hampson,M. 2019, pg.2 
• [20] NE1104b 
• [21] NE1166a (Irwin) 
• [22] NE1144a (Irwin) 
• [23] NE1180a 
• [24] Hardie,W.F.R, 1968, pg.105 
• [25] Ie.the “feature that makes them good in themselves” (Lear,G.R. 2006, pg.116)
• [26] Hampson,M. 2021, pg.23 
• [27] NE1095a 
• [28] Hampson,M. 2019, pg.4 
• [29] NE1097b - my emphasis  
• [30] NE1104b 
• [31] Ie. because they cannot know what is noble, else people would be born virtuous (fn.11) 
• [32] Hampson,M. 2020, pg.16 
• [33] Insofar as it is for personal gain 
• [34] Lear,G.R. 2006, pg.116 - my emphasis 
• [35] NE1097a 
• [36] NE1114b; NE1113a 
• [37] Though arguing for this reading is beyond the scope of this essay. 
• [38] Charles,D. 2015, pg.73 
• [39] NE1099a 
• [40] Lear,G.R. 2006, pg.117 
• [41] Hampson,M. 2019, pg.6 
• [42] Charles,D. 2015, pg.82 
• [43] Lear,G.R. 2006, pg.131 
• [44] Hampson,M. 2020, pg.17 
• [45] NE1100b (Irwin) 
• [46] Reaching the surface represents seeing the fine in action 
• [47] Cf. our potential for virtue, NE1103a 
• [48] Sanderse,W. 2020, pg.100 
• [49] NE1119b (Irwin) - my emphasis 
• [50] Hampson,M. 2019, pg.17 
• [51] Smith,A.D. 1996, pg.64 
• [52] Sanderse,W. 2020, pg.105 - quoting Annas,J. 2011 
• [53] Ibid. pg.106 
• [54] NE1102b 
• [55] NE1103b  

Bibliography

Primary source: 

• Aristotle; Reeve, C.D.C. (trans) “Nicomachean Ethics” from “Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy - From Thales to Aristotle”, Hackett Publishing Company (2016 Edition), ISBN: 9781624665325 

**Where parts were omitted in the Reeve translation, I turned to Irwin’s (specified in the footnotes)**

• Aristotle; Irwin, Terence (trans) “Nicomachean Ethics”, Hackett Publishing Company (1999 Edition), ISBN: 978-1-60384-567-0 

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• Charles, David. “Aristotle on practical and theoretical knowledge” from “Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics”, Cambridge University Press (2015 Edition) DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511846397.005 
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• Hardie, W.F.R. “Aristotle’s Ethical Theory”, Oxford University Press (1968 Edition), ISBN: 0198246331 
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