Can natural beauty be appreciated without being viewed as if it were art

By Teresa M-D, for University College London, 2022

Introduction

The traditional aesthetics of Kant and Shaftesbury assumes that “appreciation is directed towards an aesthetic object- [...] a designed [one] in art, an ordered [one] in nature.”[1] Art is conceived as a class of artefacts- putative ‘works of art’ for example, sculptures, paintings and novels. Although it may be aesthetically contemplated, nature is taken to denote an ontologically distinct category of objects, and is therefore not art. Following the hypothetical conditional phrasing- ‘as if it were art’- the question seems to assume the traditional separation. This most readily leads to an understanding of nature as “that which takes place without human intervention”.[2] Yet, in showing that the treatment of nature as if it were art (ie. artefacts of aesthetic judgement) fails to appreciate it for what it actually is, I will draw upon a more nuanced picture of nature and encourage a reconceptualisation of art in turn. Beginning with Budd’s ‘as nature’ constraint, I will be directed towards a natural environmental model of aesthetic appreciation. Then posing the challenge of the ‘orientation problem’[3], I will argue in favour of a non-cognitive position. By encouraging us to view nature experientially, I suggest a new account of art that uproots the question; this ultimately entails the conclusion that natural beauty can only be appreciated as a mode of art in itself. 

1. The natural environmental model

In order to demonstrate why treating nature as if it were art fails as an approach for its aesthetic appreciation, I begin by outlining two paradigms that do so. Firstly, the ‘object model’ suggests that through actual or contemplative extraction of something natural from its surroundings, we can “dwell on its sensuous and design qualities and its possible expressive qualities”.[4] Resonating clearly with the conception of art and nature prior outlined, it treats the features of the natural world as discrete objects of appreciation. On one interpretation, we appreciate natural beauty by designating the objects- transforming them into ‘ready-mades’. Insofar as we no longer subscribe to a creationist picture, natural objects appear ‘purposive without design’[5]; thus, our appreciation of their sensible qualities and arrangement of these into a perceptual form, enhances that of their natural beauty. This links to a second interpretation: we appreciate the objects as objects of nature. Taking nature as a collection of “self-contained aesthetic units”[6] I maintain that this is still reliant on viewing it as if it were art. Doing so more explicitly, the ‘scenery model’ proposes that we aesthetically appreciate nature as we would landscape paintings. It thus advocates for a division of the natural world into perfect scenes or “works of nature”- ideally resembling artworks.[7] 

    However, as Carlson illuminates, both models warp the character of nature. By extracting natural objects from their environments, the first neglects their “aesthetically relevant” “organic unity”[8]; by characterising the natural world as a series of two-dimensional prospects, the second fails to capture its dynamic and interconnected essence. Although I concede they capture something about what it is to aesthetically appreciate nature - for example, the pleasure we take in natural forms, and the role of perceptual and imaginative engagement - treating nature as if it were art, fails to acknowledge its phenomenological distinctness. As the shortcomings of the models allude to: nature is i) not merely the sum of various natural objects, but rather in flux and evolution. As such, nature is ii) free in a way unlike an “ontology of art objects [that] places a boundary around the object of our aesthetic contemplation”[9] either physically or conceptually. Such qualities entail a uniquely liminal relation between humans and the natural world. As Berleant puts it “the boundlessness of the natural world does not just surround us; it assimilates us”.[10] We are at once part of nature - both as biological beings and ones who continually interact with it, and outside of it- in that we are constrained to our human experience and observation. Noting the significant differences between nature and art (at least according to the traditional picture), I argue that an appropriate aesthetics of nature must satisfy Budd’s ‘as nature’ constraint: 

“Given that the natural world is not anyone’s artefact, the aesthetic appreciation of nature as nature, [...] must be of nature not as an intentionally produced object (and so not as art).”[11] For an account to be considered, it must capture both the liminality and phenomenology criterions.[12]

 

Viewing the natural world in terms of art objects (either in general, or in terms of a specific type of artwork) reduces it to something it is not, and thereby does not appreciate it for what it is. Beginning by redefining the environment as “the setting in which we exist as a sentient part”[13], the ‘natural environmental model’ (NEM) seeks to rectify this. Through emphasising the role of integration in the natural environment as a means of interpreting and appreciating it, the NEM speaks directly to our liminal position. In turn, it accounts for the phenomenology of the natural world; we must “accommodate nature’s indeterminate and varying character, [and] our multi-sensory experience and diverse understanding of it”.[14] For example, the taste of horské čučoriedky[15] or the sensation of all-encompassing wonder at the top of the Fatra Mountains cannot be captured by a still image (fig.1). However, the “environing experience of nature, as it surrounds the appreciator”[16] may be necessary for the appreciation of natural beauty but also holistically overwhelming, especially if our attention is not directed towards any particular object or feature. This is particularly salient upon considering the environments Kant* would characterise as ‘sublime’: “the capacity of the natural world to act on so monumental a scale as to exceed our powers of framing and control”.[17] Think of, for example, witnessing the simultaneous eruption and volcanic lightning of Mount Sakurajima (fig.2). The NEM therefore seems to face what I term an ‘orientation problem’:

Without anything to bound or direct our experiences of the natural world, it is left unintelligible, let alone able to be aesthetically appreciated.

 

2.1 The cognitive solution

Yet, in line with Kant’s position* that such overwhelming encounters are some of the most emotionally resonant and beautiful experiences of the natural world, their appreciation seems not just a possibility but an actuality. Carlson’s cognitivist account attempts to solve the problem highlighting the role of prior scientific knowledge in “giv[ing] us the appropriate foci of aesthetic significance and [...] boundaries of the setting.”[18] Analogously to the standards of appreciation in the arts, natural science may be seen as the appropriate means through which we can appreciate natural beauty; its “appreciation must be a way of thinking and responding that is fitted with the natural order”.[19] Knowledge allows one to not just comprehend but delight in the complexity inherent to the natural world. Consider, for example, a starling murmuration (fig.3). With a background theoretical understanding, a mathematician finds conceptual beauty in the algorithmic model that underlies their flight-pattern. They find visual beauty in the manifestation of this (ie. the flight-patterns themselves), and further reflective beauty by considering this as purposive without design. In this way, they appreciate order in two senses: the pattern or organisation of nature, and the different levels on which beauty is manifest. 

    However, the construal of the cognitivist account as a form of ‘order appreciation’ brings a challenge to the fore. Recalling the first quotation of this essay, it seems that the cognitivist take on NEM is not incompatible with an objectification of nature- viewing it in terms of ordered parts or objects. “Using knowledge of the natural forces that shaped an object”[20] the appreciator “focus[es] on a certain kind of order that the object displays”.[21] Yet a cognitivist may respond that to view nature in terms of natural order is to consider both how its parts are themselves structured, and macroscopically, how they relate to the systems in which they are embedded. Hence, one cannot fully appreciate a starling without considering its role in the phenomenon of murmuration, or- taking this as the natural object in question- the function of the performance as a predatory deterrence strategy. Budd suggests that since “all of nature necessarily reveals the natural order, all natural objects are [...] equally appreciable”[22] cognitivism invokes ‘positive aesthetics’: all natural environments are endowed with beauty in virtue of their being natural. 

    This, however, reveals a tension at the core of the position. Namely that i) knowledge extends the scope of aesthetic appreciation to encompass the whole of nature, in so far as it conveys the natural order. Yet, simultaneously, ii) knowledge seems to constrain our appreciation to the discernment of patterns. Expanding on the latter, Brady notes that with its focus on “the origins and categories of natural objects” scientific knowledge can “impede attention to [perceptual] qualities, thus diverting aesthetic attention.”[23] By emphasising natural order and patterns, it seems the cognitivist account fails to recognise the “provisional and elusive character of aesthetic qualities in nature”.[24] As such, I argue that it does not wholly satisfy the phenomenological distinctness criterion of the ‘as nature’ constraint. For example, although knowledge that the petal colour of hydrangeas is dependent on soil pH (fig. 4) allows us to categorise them and so renders the environment more intelligible, this takes away from the very thing that makes the plants so aesthetically interesting. Namely, that whilst they may be one species, their perceptual qualities are wholly contingent on their environments; they are simultaneously unified and in flux. 

2.2 The non-cognitive solution and art as experience

In my opinion, Berleant’s ‘aesthetics of engagement’[25] (AE) best realises the aim of the NEM in satisfying the ‘as nature’ constraint. Reinforcing our position in relation to nature, AE renders it intelligible through our very immersion, yet acknowledges that we are limited to interpretation since it is via a “combin[ation] of imagination with informed perspective [...that] we can realise what we observe”.[26] As such AE resonates with the idea that, unlike in the traditional view of art as designed or designated objects, in nature no distinction can be drawn between an ‘artist’ and the ‘art’.[27] For example, the wind that generates sand-dunes is itself aesthetically relevant in our appreciation of them (fig.5). The “feeling of being [...] infused with an enveloping, engaging tactility”[28] enables appreciation of that environment- for example, allowing us to imagine how the dune forms are sculpted and shifted, thereby recognising them as the transient products of a powerful creative force (wind). In this way, AE perfectly captures both the unfixedness of nature itself and our perspective upon it as we- either physically or via contemplative imagination “move through an environment, engaging all our bodily senses.”[29]  

    However, whilst the ability for imagination to “encourage a variety of possible perceptual perspectives” may lead it to “expand and enrich appreciation”[30], its seeming unboundedness makes it unsuited to orient this appreciation. It may, for example, lead one to create a narrative inspired by the environment [31] - in turn, transforming it into a ‘work of art’ and so only appreciating it in a contorted and vicarious way. If correct, then, like its cognitive counterpart, AE may be charged with the objectification of nature found in traditional aesthetics. Yet, one may draw upon the Kantian notion of ‘free-play’ in response. This is the idea that “because aesthetic judgements are not determined by any concept” the “activities of imagination freely harmonise with those of the understanding”.[32] Whilst immersed in nature, I contend that we employ what Brady terms ‘exploratory imagination’.[33] This is appropriately bounded by what is being experienced and observed (for example, the dunes themselves), and moreover synthesises the features of free-play: imagination and understanding. Using imagination to contemplate and explore the features of natural environments, one gains understanding of the ways in which they interact to form those environments. 

    Elucidating how free-play both facilitates and orientates our appreciation of natural beauty, I conclude by drawing upon Dewey’s account of art as experience: “an experience has pattern and structure [...] it is not just doing and undergoing in alternation, but consists of them in relationship”.[34] On my interpretation, even the most holistically overwhelming experiences of nature are comprehensive, because, through the harmony inherent in the interaction of observer and environment, emerges a pattern and structure. As opposed to conceptual knowledge, it is the elements of an individual’s perspective that shape this interaction. Hence, the environment reveals different levels of natural beauty to different observers, meanwhile the awareness that we are limited to interpretation enables “recognition of nature’s otherness implicit in our appreciation”.[35] Taking experience as primary, Dewey’s picture captures both the dynamic phenomenology of nature and our liminal relation to it. Moreover, it accounts for the ostensive understanding of art in society- particularly performance art, wherein a blurring of the art/ artist distinction is central, just as in the appreciation of the natural world. This highlights the unifying function of Dewey’s account; rather than reductively framing nature in terms of art objects, it allows us to view its aesthetic appreciation as a mode of art itself that can, moreover, inform others. 

Conclusion

Through conveying how the treatment of the aesthetic appreciation of nature in accordance with a traditional object-based picture mischaracterises it, I have argued that regarding natural beauty in a distinct way from art (as so conceived) is not only possible, but the only means of appreciating it for what it is. Overcoming the challenges of a cognitive account, the aesthetics of engagement seems to best satisfy Budd’s ‘as nature’ constraint: a synthesis of the phenomenological distinctness and liminal relation criteria. Prompted to question the assumption I take to be implicit in the question (namely, that of art being the class of artefacts), I then briefly suggested viewing art as a kind of experience. Taken as such, our appreciation of nature according to AE, treats it not as if it were art, but as a distinctive mode of art itself. This both clarifies how AE can overcome the orientation problem and supports its claim to being aesthetic appreciation. Moreover, it satisfies what Carlson terms the ‘unified aesthetics requirement’ for an appropriate aesthetics of nature.[36] Defining both the appreciation of ‘works of art’ and natural beauty experientially, one can retain the meanings of ‘appreciation’, ‘beauty’ and so forth, and treat nature as nature. 

• [1] Berleant, A. 1992, pg.164 - my emphasis 
• [2] Mill, J.S. 1874 - taking ‘intervention’ as direct action, not merely perceptual interaction 
• [3] My terminology 
• [4] Carlson, A. 1979, pg.268 
• [5] *Kant, I. 1790 
• [6] Carlson, A. 1979, pg.269 
• [7] Carlson, A. 2020, Sect.1.1 
• [8] Carlson, A. 1979, pg.269 
• [9] Clark, S. 2010, pg.353 
• [10] Berleant, A. 1992, pg.169 
• [11] Budd, M. 2000, pg.138 
• [12] My terminology/ interpretation following from the above discussion
• [13] Carlson, A. 1979, pg.271 
• [14] Carlson, A. 2020, Sect.2.2 
• [15] Mountain blueberries 
• [16] Brady, E. 2003, pg.121 
• [17] Berleant, A. 1992, pg.167
• [18] Carlson, A. 1979, pg.273 
• [19] Moore, R. 1999, pg.50 
• [20] Clark, S. 2010, pg.355  
• [21] Budd, M. 2000, pg.146 - both my emphasis 
• [22] Ibid. pg.147 23 
• [23] Brady, E. 1998, pg.141 
• [24] Clark, S. 2010, pg.354 
• [25] Berleant, A. 1992 (influenced by Hepburn, R. 1966) 
• [26] Ibid. pg.52 
• [27] Taking ‘artist’ as nature itself, including the observer 
• [28] Carlson, A. 2007, pg.8 
• [29] Clark, S. 2010, pg.354 
• [30] Brady, E. 1998, pg.142 
• [31] Eg. consider Romantic poetry inspired by the ‘sublime’ 
• [32] Gibbons, S.L. 1994, pg.92 - my emphasis 
• [33] Brady, E. 1998, pg.143 
• [34] Dewey, J. 1980, pg.44 
• [35] Brady, E. 2003, pg.121
• [36] Carlson,A. 2007, pg.5 

Bibliography

• Berleant, Arnold. “The Aesthetics of Art and Nature” from “The Aesthetics of Environment” Temple University Press, (1992 Edition) pg. 160-175 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt14bs997.15 
• Brady, Emily. “Imagination and the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature” from “The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, Wiley (1998 Edition, Vol. 56, No. 2) pg. 139-147 URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/432252 
• Brady, Emily. “The Integrated Aesthetic I: Multi-sensuous Engagement and Disinterestedness” from “Aesthetics of the Natural Environment”, Edinburgh University Press (2003 Edition) URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctvxcrg5h.9 
• Budd, Malcolm. “The Aesthetics of Nature” from “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society”, Oxford University Press, (2000 Edition, Vol. 100), pg. 137-157 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545321 
• Carlson, Allen. “Appreciation and the Natural Environment” from “The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism”, Wiley (1979 Edition, Vol. 37, No. 3), pg. 267- 275 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/430781 
• Carlson, Allen; Zalta, Edward N. (Ed.) “Environmental Aesthetics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition) URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/environmental-aesthetics/ 
• Carlson, Allen. “The Requirements for An Adequate Aesthetics of Nature” from “Environmental Philosophy: Environmental Aesthetics and Ecological Restoration”, Philosophy Documentation Center (2007 Edition Vol. 4, No. 1 & 2) pg. 1-14 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26167137 
• Clark, Samantha. “Contemporary Art and Environmental Aesthetics” from “Environmental Values”, White Horse Press (2010 Edition, Vol. 19) pg. 351-371 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25764255 
• Dewey, John. “Having an Experience” from “Art as Experience”, Perigee Books (1980 Edition), pg. 35-57, SBN: 399-50025-1 
• Gibbons, Sarah. L. “Kant’s Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience”, Oxford University Press (1994 Edition), pg. 92-107, ISBN: 0-19-824041-4 
• Kant, Immanuel; Bernard, J.H. (trans) “Critique of Judgement” New York: Hafner (1951 Edition, first published 1790) ISBN: 9780028475004 
• Moore, Ronald. “Appreciating Natural Beauty as Natural” from “The Journal of Aesthetic Education” University of Illinois Press (1999 Edition, Vol. 33), pg. 42-60 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3333701 

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Appendix

 

Figure 1: Fatra Mountains (Slovakia) Source: https://www.mountaintracks.co.uk/holidays/mala-fatra-trek - photographer unknown 

Figure 2: Volcanic lightning at Mount Sakurajima Source: https://science.nasa.gov/sakurajima-volcano-lightning - Martin Rietze 

 Figure 3: Starling murmuration in Lancashire Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-lancashire-60736370 - David Cousins 

 Figure 4: Hydrangea macrophylla bushes Source:https://www.saga.co.uk/magazine/home-garden/gardening/plants/shrubs/how-to-grow-hydrangeas - Val Bourne 

 Figure 5: Namibian sand-dunes Source:https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/sand-dunes-communicate-they-migrate-18 0974138/ - Nico Marcutti