Posted by

Aristotelian virtue ethics pt.1: are virtue-friendships ultimately selfishly motivated?

 By Teresa Macey-Dare, for University College London, 2022


Introduction

Exploring the nature and value of friendship is fundamental to Aristotle’s ethical project: since humans are naturally social animals,[1] and to be good one must perform their function well, it follows that friends are “most necessary for life [eudaimon]”.[2] One must note, however, that the Greek word ‘philia’ is broader than its translated counterpart, and is more akin to personal relationships. This allows us to make clearer sense of the distinctions Aristotle draws between utility, pleasure, and virtue-friendships. As will be explored, he takes the last of these to be the most perfect because the parties display mutual love on the basis of intrinsic goodness, rather than instrumental value. Yet, with its source and reflection in self-love, many contest that the goodwill on display in virtue-friendships is “not for the sake of [our friend] but [...] our personal self-fulfilment”.[3] This would render them ultimately selfishly motivated. Here I take ‘selfish’ to mean: for the sake of one’s self-interest, in turn displaying self-love or a desire to be one’s best self. This is not mutually exclusive of wanting the other party to also benefit. I assume an ‘ultimate motivation’ to be the primary but not necessarily singular driving force behind some choice or action. 

After outlining the distinctions Aristotle draws between the kinds of friendship (given that he defines virtue-friendship via comparison) I explore how we should interpret his idea of a virtue-friend being ‘another self’. Arguing that virtue-friendship is largely motivated by a view of the friend as instrumentally valuable, coexistent with yet non-reducible to intrinsic valuation, I will conclude that such friendships are indeed ultimately selfishly motivated. 


1. Aristotle's theory of friendship

Before discussing its different manifestations, Aristotle sets out the necessary conditions of friendship in general. For one, it requires “mutual loving” and “reciprocal goodwill”[4], and so can only obtain between two animate objects. We wish good to our friends “for [their] own sake”[5]  whereas, the extent of well-wishing for objects is constrained to the purpose they serve. Humorously illustrating this with the example of wine, Aristotle cites that one may only hope for its preservation insofar as it can provide pleasure in drinking later. The example, I believe, serves to elucidate why both reciprocal goodwill and an awareness of this are integral to friendship. As an inanimate object, wine cannot i) display goodwill towards the individual in turn, and ii) have any awareness of the goodwill that could theoretically (ie. were it a conscious animate object) encourage it to reciprocate. Explicating the concept of friendship further, Aristotle distinguishes between ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ friendships; the latter constituted by those based in pleasure or utility, whilst the former characterised by virtue-friendships alone. The resulting three-fold division takes hold in “what it is that attracts and binds the one person to the other”.[6]  Incomplete friendships are based on a mutual gain for the parties involved. Utility-friends - for example the relationship between shopkeeper and customer - wish each other well to the extent that they are useful or advantageous to one another. In a parallel way, pleasure-friends - for example young lovers - do so to the extent that they provide one another hedonistic benefits. Warne neatly sums this up in terms of the concept of “parity: the friends wish good for each other and receive in return something of equal value.”[7] 

In this way, the motivations behind such friendships are selfish though the benefits are mutual. Hence, Aristotle’s classing of these as ‘incomplete’; as one friend loves the other not “insofar as he is who he is, but as he provides some good or pleasure”[8] the friendships are merely coincidental. Based on the accidental properties of each individual, for example, they’re owning a shop (not a feature essential to their being human), the friends value one another instrumentally. Yet, recall that wishing goods for the sake of the friend is a prerequisite for any friendship at all. This seems to imply showing respect for one another’s intrinsic value. I thus draw on Cooper's approach: in the case of incomplete friendships, well-wishing for the sake of the other occurs through the benefit they offer and knowledge that you reciprocate. This is compatible with the friends being conceived “in an external and incidental way”.[9] For example, the customer wishes that the shopkeeper is happy, healthy and commercially successful, but not so successful that he decides to sell-up and close the business. As Cooper summarises, one wants their friend “to prosper, for his own sake” but “not to the extent that one no longer gets the [...] benefits he has received from associating with him”.[10]   

By contrast, virtue-friendships are ‘complete’ because “both people are loveable without qualification”.[11]  This kind holds between two good individuals brought together in virtue of that goodness. Grounding the attitude of reciprocal goodwill and mutual loving upon an admiration of character, virtue-friends value one another intrinsically.[12] Though Aristotle does not deny that benefits are conferred through the friendship, unlike incomplete friendships, virtue-friends wish well for one another’s own sake independently of these. In stating that “good people are also pleasant [...and] useful to each other”[13] the benefits are clearly presented as secondary. For example, virtue-friendship is useful because each party can learn from the other’s goodness and hence, develop their own virtue. Yet, as Aristotle frames it, the benefit is not a necessary condition of the friendship. Further, because it is not contingent on the activity of the parties - here taking ‘activity’ to mean a specific function being performed that defines an individual’s role in the relationship, for example the customer continuing to buy from the shop - virtue-“friendship lasts as long as [the friends] are good and virtue is enduring”.[14] They have particular stability because, insofar as having such friends is part of a eudaimon, it contributes to the virtues of the individuals. This clarifies the sense in which virtue-friendships involve shared lives and can only occur in small numbers. Grounded on intrinsically valuing one another first and foremost, Aristotle characterises the motivation of virtue-friendships as “loving and friendship” itself.[15]  

 

2. Virtue-friends as ‘another self’

Despite their presentation as contrary to incomplete friendships, many scholars have argued that the motivation behind virtue-friendships is also selfish. The controversy is instigated by Aristotle’s discussion of self-love. On his account, the features of friendship - for example, wishing each other well and sharing in pains and pleasures - are derived from the relationship one has to oneself.[16] Since he claims that both self-love and friendship require virtue, “the decent person has each of these features in relation to himself, and is related to his friend as he is to himself”.[17] Consequently the friend is ‘another self’. Taken to be a mirror or extension of oneself, the friend therefore cannot be valued intrinsically for who they are. That virtue-friendships are sought only as a means of affirming or increasing one’s self-love is reinforced by Aristotle: “one is a friend to himself most of all, [so] should love himself most of all”.[18] This seems to accord with what Schroeder terms the ‘reassurance argument’, according to which, observing ‘another self’ provides epistemic access to all or part of one's own goodness, and in turn, enhances self-understanding.[19] The interpretation is plausible, especially given the importance Aristotle places on perceiving and understanding as a ground for deciding what is choiceworthy (hence, the eudaimon).[20] Framed in this way, self-interest appears to be a clear motivating factor behind virtue-friendships. 

However, I think that taking ‘another self’ as such (ie. as a direct copy of oneself) fails to capture the nature and value of virtue-friends. As an essential part of “living well continuously and with pleasure and interest”[21], friendship seems to require embracing the complexities of one another’s characters. If a virtue-friend only serves to reflect the goodness of one’s own character, then opportunities for (moral) development are limited; we thereby lose the sense in which eudaimonia is an ongoing activity. I believe this is the interpretation Aristotle would favour. For one, he suggests that even good people have the capacity for viciousness, and further, that we should not haste to dissolve the friendship but “try [...] to rescue his character, [...] insofar as character is both better and more proper to friendship”.[22] In this way, virtue-friends must be slightly different from one another to allow for the practice and cultivation of virtue. However, drawn together by their shared end of goodness, they are the same. This fits with a picture of eudaimonia as continual self-improvement - I take to follow from its characterisation as an activity of the soul. Without the potential for betterment, it would appear to be an end-state. Yet, this jars with the prospect of moral-paradigms: perfectly virtuous individuals, who in turn are living a eudaimon but appear incapable of self-development. Following Cooper, I dismiss the worry by questioning the very possibility of such individuals. As Aristotle himself notes, virtuous people “seem to become still better from their activities and mutual correction”.[23]  

The favoured interpretation of ‘another self’ bolstered by this view of eudaimonia, again renders virtue-friendships selfishly motivated. Aristotle offers support for this conclusion by the very way he seeks to avoid it: a distinction between the common-place understanding of self-love (ie. relating to egoistic individuals) and that of the virtuous person who acts in accordance with rationality. Aristotle claims that “the desire for what is fine [good self-lovers] differs from the desire for what seems advantageous [bad self-lovers]”[24]. However, since virtue-friendships are both fine and advantageous[25] it seems that all self-love is, at least partly, ‘bad’ (based in self-interest). This is reinforced by noting the numerous references to the benefit of virtue-friendships for each party as individuals, rather than in mutual terms. For example, we should seek to spend time with virtue-friends “most of all whenever they will benefit us greatly”.[26] As mentioned, the friendships are presented as an integral part of human flourishing; one friend needs the other for some end, and as such, treats him with instrumental value. More explicitly still, by actively participating in a shared virtuous life the virtue-friends realise themselves through one another. Through analogy with a craftsman, Aristotle claims: “what he is potentially, the product [friend] indicates in actualisation” thus “the producer is fond of the product, because he loves his own being”.[27] 


3. Ultimately anthropophilic motivation? 

Following the above, the virtue-friend seems necessary for one’s self-actualisation - which I take to mean becoming the best version of oneself, or living in accordance with virtue (ie. eudaimonia). Yet herein lies a promising defence for Aristotle. Since, in the harmonious soul of a flourishing person, reason is the “best and most controlling part of oneself [which] most defines what a person is”,[28] the self-love cultivated through virtue-friendship consists in “respect for one’s mind”.[29] Hence, self-actualisation is centred on a realisation of our nature as human beings.[30] So conceived, the motivation behind virtue-friendships may be seen as non-selfish. For Aristotle, it is our rational capacity (or nous) that distinguishes and makes us superior to other non-human animals, and, most significantly, makes contemplation and so eudaimonia possible; as Hughes notes, “specifically human fulfilment involves the mind [...] which in an important sense is our self.”[31] So, as “lov[ing] each other for what each truly is” crucially involves “aware[ness] of the nous of the other”[32], the friendship may be seen as driven by a love of humanity. I term this ‘anthropophilic’ motivation. This interpretation is primarily supported in Aristotle’s claim: “one friend wishes good things to the other for the sake of the other himself, the other must remain whatever sort of being he is.”[33] Well-wishing for the sake of one another is constrained to the extent that each is a human. Wishing for the greatest good, namely that “he becomes a God”[34], would not be loving the friend for who he essentially is, thereby leaving both parties without their virtue-friendship and unable to flourish. Highlighting that the words Aristotle uses (autos diairetos) convey the friend as both another and a separate self, Sherman further suggests that each promotes the other’s good in a way “mindful of [the friend’s] mature rational agency”.[35] 

In spite of its initial promise, however, the possibility that anthropophilic and self-interested motivations are compatible is not precluded. For one, the intrinsic value of the friend - qua rational human - is only derived through introspection and one’s love of themself. The friendship reinforces this self-love; it is choiceworthy because it is necessary for the realisation of human capacities. Contra Aristotle’s presentation of them as secondary goods, virtue-friendship appears to directly synthesise utility and pleasure. It is useful insofar as it is essential to eudaimonia, and pleasureful in turn. This characterisation fits with the claim that: “each person wishes goods most of all to himself.”[36] Second, though anthropophilic motivation entails that I value my virtue-friend essentially (ie. as a human being), it does not entail valuing them for who they are in particular (ie. as a unique individual). Linking back to my discussion of the friend as ‘another self’, one may posit that a virtue-friend is selected on the basis of how their character may supplement and enhance my own, in turn, facilitating my moral development. For example, a boorish person will seek a witty friend,[37] so as to aid cultivation of this virtue. The selection of a virtue-friend is thus rooted in ourselves; we treat their character as instrumentally valuable for our eudaimon. 


Conclusion

Since a eudaimon cannot be lived without virtue-friendship, a significant part of the motivation behind forming such relationships does appear to be selfish. This reading is reinforced by Aristotle’s discussion of self-love and the view of one's friend as a ‘another self’ that follows. Whilst I argue that virtue-friendship involves an affirmation of one another’s humanity (ie. an anthropophilic motivation), this is not mutually exclusive of instrumental valuation. Moreover, this finds its source in the friendship one has to themself: in recognising my innately human rational capacity (nous), I gain a love of humanity; and it is only through my self-knowledge that I can select the virtue-friend most conducive for my flourishing. Yet, though anthropophilic motivation is embedded within selfish ones that together form the ultimate motivation, it nonetheless presents a non-reducible intrinsic valuation of the friend. I therefore suggest that Aristotle can maintain virtue-friendship as distinct from incomplete friendships in the way he sets out; though in all cases the motivation is selfish, it is only in virtue-friendships that one wishes well for the sake of the other not solely because of or through the benefits they may offer. 

  • [1] See eg.NE1155a 
  • [2] Ibid. - taking ‘life’ as flourishing as a human 
  • [3] Hughes,G.J. 2001, pg.176
  • [4] NE1155b 
  • [5] Ibid. 
  • [6] Cooper,J.M. 1977, pg.623 
  • [7] Warne,C. 2006, pg.115
  • [8] NE1156a 
  • [9] Cooper,J.M. 1977, pg.641 
  • [10] Ibid. pg.636 
  • [11] Warne,C. 2006, pg.114 
  • [12] Hughes,G.J. 2001, pg.170 
  • [13] NE1157a - my emphasis 
  • [14] NE1156b 
  • [15] Ibid. 
  • [16] NE1166a 
  • [17] NE1166a-b 
  • [18] NE1168b 
  • [19] Schroeder,D.N. 1992, pg.205 
  • [20] NE1170a-b 
  • [21] Bennett,H. 2021, 2.1 
  • [22] NE1165b 
  • [23] NE1172a 
  • [24] NE1169a 
  • [25] Ie. part of the eudaimon, which I have defined in reference to self-improvement 
  • [26] NE1171b
  • [27] NE1168a - my emphasis 
  • [28] Hughes,G.J. 2001, pg.174 
  • [29] Ibid. 
  • [30] Terminology from NE1168a 
  • [31] Hughes,G.J. 2001, pg.178 
  • [32] Schroeder,D.N. 1992, pg.214 
  • [33] NE1159a 
  • [34] Ibid. 
  • [35] Sherman,N. 1987, pg.607 
  • [36] NE1159a 
  • [37] See the doctrine of the mean - NE1108a


Bibliography


Primary source: 
  • Aristotle; Irwin, Terence (trans) “Nicomachean Ethics”, Hackett Publishing Company (1985 Edition), pg. 207-266, ISBN: 0-915145-65-0 

Secondary sources: 
  • Bennett, Helm; Zalta, Edward. N. (ed) “Value and Justification of Friendship” from “Friendship”, The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2021 Edition), Sect. 2.1 URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/friendship/
  • Cooper, John. M. “Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship” from “The Review of Metaphysics”, Philosophy Education Society Inc. (1977 Edition, Vol. 30, No. 4), pg. 619-648 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126987 
  • Hughes, Gerard. J. “Aristotle on Ethics”, Routledge (2001 Edition), pg. 167-182 ISBN: 0-415-22186-2 
  • Schroeder, Donald. N. “Aristotle on the Good of Virtue-Friendship” from “History of Political Thought”, Imprint Academic Ltd. (1992 Edition, Vol. 13, No. 2), pg. 203-218 URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/26214086
  • Sherman, Nancy. “Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life” from “Philosophy and Phenomenological Research”, International Phenomenological Society (1987 Edition, Vol. 47, No. 4), pg. 589-613, URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107230 
  • Warne, Christopher. “Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”, Continuum International Publishing Group (2006 Edition), pg. 107-123, ISBN: 0-8264-8554-5  

Comments

Post a Comment